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This thesis studies the reference price formation under reverse market conditions, determined by the pre-
vailing bull and bear sentiment trends. I investigate the turnover changes after initial public oﬀering (IPO),
which forms a natural reference point for the investors, to which they compare all forthcoming price move-
ments. The results imply that a stock is traded more when its market price exceeds the oﬀer price, that
the investor has initially paid to obtain the asset. Additionally, the IPO stocks that begin trading at a
gain, tend to be traded more, as they fall below their initial purchase price for the first time. However,
the initially losing stocks are not found to be traded more when their market price surpasses the initial
oﬀer price, which is not consistent with previous research. Regarding the eﬀect of the market trends,
investors seem to be more optimistic in the formation of their reference prices during bull markets, than
during bear conditions. Moreover, new stock price maximums and minimums seem to strongly influence the
reference point formation across diﬀerent market conditions. Under bull circumstances, investors are also
more quicker in reacting to new price maximums and minimums, when compared to the bear conditions,
under which the reference prices do not seem to be updated as strongly, if at all, to new price crossings.
Therefore, it can be interpreted that investors do adapt their notions on winnings and losses based on new
information gained from the stock’s current market performance, as they tend to wait longer to sell a losing
stock and are also more eager to sell the winning stock before it rises any further. Finally, investors seeming
to react faster during bull trends can be due to more frequent follow-up of their assets, which has been
found characteristic for bull market investors.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
The history of the stock markets has experienced both times of great booms as well as periods
of volatile turmoil. The recent financial crisis has acted as a forceful reminder of the fluctuating
nature of the market conditions into two reverse directions. Vast market bubbles, followed
by sudden market crashes, form recurring anomalies that cannot be extensively explained
through traditional finance theory. It would be therefore of great importance to understand
the main drivers behind the market, namely the investors and their behavioral patterns under
diﬀerent market conditions.
Moreover, finance models, such as the eﬃcient market hypothesis, are based on the premise
that investors act rationally. However, recent studies in the field of behavioral finance have
proven several inconsistencies in investor behavior, that conflict the traditional view on ra-
tional investors. These behavioral biases produce trading deviations that contradict the im-
plications of economic rationality.
In fact, investors have been empirically found to estimate plausible decisions relative to a
distinct mental reference level, namely some subjective reference point, when faced with un-
certain situations. When it comes to losses, investors tend to seek risks, as opposed to avoiding
risks when faced with a likely positive outcome (Gneezy, 2005). These are determinants of
the disposition eﬀect, which represents a well identifiable bias, that yet so far lacks evidence
on the level of market-wide eﬀects, but has been widely studied and recognized as a true
phenomenon.
One of the greatest challenges to the field of finance is the exceptionally large degree of
trading activity in the financial markets (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). For this purpose,
it is necessary to analyze market-wide data, which describes the whole equilibrium of the
system. However, until recently, studying investor behavior based only on stock exchange
data has been proven diﬃcult, because of lack of unbiased and eﬀective methods.
The diﬃculty in studying the reference prices as a market-wide eﬀect has been the in lack
2of information on the reference prices of the traded assets. Therefore, studies conducted so
far have mainly employed particular databases based on individual investor behavior. As the
study of Kaustia (2004), which acts as the methodological framework for this paper, shows,
this issue is however surmountable by studying the behavior of investors after initial public
oﬀering (IPO). In fact, initial public oﬀerings provide a prominent aid for investigation, as a
typical reference price would be the initial purchase price, as the oﬀering price is shared by
all investors. This enables me to research the market-wide data on the disposition eﬀect by
studying initial public oﬀerings.
Moreover, there exists but a few studies incorporating the market conditions in the investor
sentiment analyses, especially concerning the use of market-wide information. One reason
behind the lack of significant results lies in the precondition of eﬃcient market hypothesis,
according to which all information should be incorporated within the prices in the market.
However, as research has shown, this hypothesis is not always empirically consistent. The
studies so far concentrating on the market conditions and disposition eﬀect, have focused
on either on the demand of individuals or the relation between market conditions and IPO
returns, rather than the underlying behavioral determinants. None is performed by analyzing
the whole market as one model and testing whether the trends influence the reference price
formation of the investors. Motivated by this, my analysis draws the main focus beyond
the sole purpose of investigating the post-IPO trading volume changes, and incorporates the
eﬀects of the market conditions prevailing at the time of the oﬀering.
1.2 Existing literature
Prior empirical research has found evidence on investors having a lower propensity to sell
stocks, that are trading at a capital loss. At the same time, investors have been found prone
to sell oﬀ their winning stocks. This phenomenon is characterized as the disposition eﬀect.
Furthermore, this eﬀect has been documented to depend on distinct reference points, held
inside individual investors’ mental accounts. These reference points are influenced by new
information facing the investor. Therefore, the logical way to investigate the reference price
formation is to study its eﬀects via the disposition eﬀect framework, by considering it as a
3precondition.
The disposition eﬀect has been well documented in studies using aggregate market-wide data
(Lakonishok, 1986; Ferris and Haugen, 1988; Bremer, 1996), data on individual investors
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Odean, 1998), as well as based on experimental questionnaires
(Weber and Camererb, 1998). However, disposition eﬀect based on aggregate market data
has not been comprehensively studied by incorporating market conditions into the analysis.
Reference point formation studies have established a firm connection between the disposi-
tion eﬀect and investors’ tendency to hold separate mental accounts for diﬀerent investments
(Arkes et al., 2008; Baucells and Weber, 2011; Kliger and Kudryavtsev, 2008). There is
nevertheless some dispute over which is the correct reference price: purchase price, maxi-
mum/minimum price, or some other adjustable price. While the initial purchase price has
accomplished its ground as a considerably reliable reference point, it opens up an intriguing
research subject on testing the reference point formation based on initial public oﬀerings’
returns. Moreover, this thesis studies other plausible reference points that can be derived
from the results of the post-IPO trading volume changes.
Additionally, this study will expand the research of Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008) and Kaus-
tia (2004) by incorporating the market condition analysis into the IPO data. Existing liter-
ature suggests that for negative initial return IPOs turnover seems to be significantly lower
when the stock is trading below the oﬀer price. Furthermore, when the stock price for the
first time surpasses the oﬀer price, the turnover is evidenced to increase significantly, which
is recorded to last for a period of two weeks. Stock price minimums and maximums are also
found to be followed by trade volume increases (Kaustia, 2004). Whether these eﬀects occur
following the same pattern both during bull markets, where the sentiment is high, and bear
markets, where the sentiment lies lower, is the major concern within this thesis. The eﬀects
are hypothesized to diﬀer according to the prevailing market trend, as investor behavior has
been found as one of the key determinants behind market behavior. Thus, reference price
formation under diﬀerent market conditions should be further studied in order to understand
the behavioral biases behind market price formation.
41.3 Research Problem and Purpose
The aim of this paper is to study, whether market conditions have an eﬀect on the reference
point formation of investors. Therefore, my research problem is the following:
Do stock market conditions aﬀect the aggregate market reference price forma-
tion?
The magnitude of the disposition eﬀect is studied both through the eﬀect of bullish/bearish
markets and through trading volume succeeding the IPO oﬀer date. Additional variables,
such as the market trend at the time of the oﬀering and the size of the underpricing, are
introduced in the preliminary analysis on the trading volume. In light of understanding the
reference price formation even more deeply, the results suggest a need for further analysis,
which is conducted by dividing the data groups based on both these significant results yielding
variables, motivated by the eﬀect the variable seems to have on both research groups. Evidence
in any of the empirical analyses showing strong disposition eﬀect would suggest some form of
market ineﬃciency, as there might arise windows of opportunities for arbitrage.
1.4 Structure of the Study
Understanding the purpose of this study requires knowledge on both behavioral finance and
its mechanisms as well as the basics on the pricing of initial public oﬀerings. Moreover,
investor sentiment is linked to market conditions.
The theoretical background including prior empirical research is described thoroughly in Sec-
tion 2, which begins with an introduction to the key concepts and theories. This serves
as the frame of reference for the later empirical analysis. Furthermore, there exists several
approaches into examining the disposition eﬀect based on diﬀerent data sources, which are
described in more detail.
Section 3 introduces the main hypotheses presumably leading to the answer of the research
question, that are generated on the basis of the previous section’s literature review. The
logical continuum from this leads to Section 4, where the methodology, that will be applied
5in the data analysis, is introduced. Consequently, Section 5 describes the characteristics of
the data sample used in this study.
Section 6 represents the specific empirical results of the data analysis and the validation for
the hypotheses. Finally, Section 7 includes a summary of the study as a whole, as well as the
final conclusions drawn from the results.
2 Theoretical background
This section introduces important concepts and theories essential for understanding the back-
ground of this study. Initial public oﬀerings and their underpricing occurrence are discussed
briefly, mainly concentrating on their eﬀect on the post-IPO trading volume, which forms the
basis for the later forthcoming analysis. Moreover, behavioral finance is discussed in more
detail by introducing the main behavioral theories interconnected to the subject of this study.
The focus is kept particularly on prospect theory, which forms the basis for disposition eﬀect,
the key concept for understanding the reference price formation.
2.1 Initial public oﬀerings and the underpricing phenomenon
Initial public oﬀerings are considered underpriced when they exhibit positive first-day returns.
Several studies, such as (Ibbotson and Jaﬀe, 1975; Ritter, 1984; Levis, 1990), have provided
empirical evidence on the determinants of IPOs average underpricing. Prior empirical studies
provide several diﬀerent reasons for underpricing. These include theories such as information
asymmetry (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986), second signaling (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt,
1989) third legal liability and litigation risk (Tinic, 1988), information cascade eﬀects (Welch,
1992), and finally investor behavior (Derrien, 2005; Ljungqvist, 2003). For the purpose of this
thesis, at this point there is no need to characterize these in more detail, as the focus is kept
on the trading volume eﬀects.
IPO stocks tend to exhibit large initial returns but poor long-term performance and can
therefore be considered to be overpriced in the after-market (Ljungqvist, 2003). In other
words, empirical research has shown that large initial return firms tend to underperform the
negative initial return firms in the long run. Because these IPO return patterns have been
proven to vary in time, there exists so called hot and cold periods of IPO volume in history
(Ritter, 1984).
Regarding the existing studies focusing on the market conditions and IPO markets, significant
results are obtained by Derrien (2005). He finds, that if there exists a bull market at the time
7of the IPO oﬀering, shares on average tend to be overpriced. Overpricing of IPOs is found to be
aﬀected by both the noise traders bullishness and by the IPO fees. Under both circumstances
(high bull markets and high fees) the underwriter has an incentive to set an aggressive IPO
price. Correspondingly, as the intensity of noise trader sentiment at oﬀering increases, so does
the IPO price and the level of initial return. Hence, (Loughran, 2002) argues, that positive
initial return is not anymore the consequence of underpricing, but rather occurs (despite
of overpricing) because of partial adjustment to public information. Also Long et al. (1990)
developed theories on noise trading. They argue that as some investors trade based on a noisy
signal that is unrelated to fundamentals, the asset prices will deviate from their intrinsic value.
In bullish market conditions the issuer will eventually raise more money, which is one of the
main reasons why IPOs tend to cluster in hot issue markets. Furthermore, according to
Ljungqvist (2003) initial returns are negatively correlated with the recent number of oﬀerings
in the same industry, even though they are overall higher at hot issue markets.
Most studies focus on analyzing only the hot issue periods, because there are significantly
more IPOs during those periods, which enhances the validity of the results. Hot issue market
is defined as a month in which the average first-day return is above the median month’s
average first-day return (Ibbotson and Jaﬀe, 1975). According to Loughran (2002), there
is strong positive serial correlation in the monthly average first-day returns, which cannot
be explained consistently with rational behavior of investors. Essentially they claim, that
according to prospect theory, market rises are followed by an increase in IPO underpricing in
all IPOs within the selling period (nevertheless the date of going public), which can explain
the correlation. Therefore, high average first-day returns will be observed for one to two
months after market rises, because this is typically the range within which the issuers anchor
their price range.
Loughran (2002) and Lowry and Oﬃcer (2010) argue underpricing stemming from indirect
compensation to underwriters. Namely, investment bankers benefit from a lower oﬀer price
firstly because it makes it easier to find buyers for IPOs (reducing their marketing costs), and
secondly because investors will engage in rent-seeking behavior in order to get priority over
the allocation of hot IPO shares (which also increases the underwriters revenues in terms of
8gross spread). Moreover, overallotment options are not generally taken into account. During
strong demand, overallotment options are much more likely to be exercised, thus aﬀecting the
trading volume. Furthermore, as there are overallotment options in 15% of all IPOs, their
exercise would aﬀect all the results. Loughran (2002) argues that in IPOs, gains and losses are
computed relative to the price that the issuing firm’s executives have anchored on. According
to them, the IPO reference point oﬀer price is the midpoint of the file range.
While the before mentioned studies find that high initial returns go together with hot IPO
markets, Lowry and Oﬃcer (2010) argue that these hot markets also possess extraordinary
high variability of initial returns. Over time, there exists a strong correlation between the
mean and the volatility of initial returns. They suggest, that the level of uncertainty and the
underwriter’s ability to value the firms varies over time. In fact, one of the main problems
facing issuers in IPO pricing is the aggregate demand uncertainty. There is an asymmetry of
information between the issuing firm and the market, which is resolved through the initiation
of trading, as the market participants’ information is reflected in the prices.
Furthermore, it is found that IPO initial return variability is significantly higher when there
are more diﬃcult-to-value firms going public. These firms include young, small and technology
firms. Lowry and Oﬃcer (2010) also find that the high variability of initial returns goes hand
in hand with hot issue markets, stating that there is a strong positive correlation between the
mean and the volatility of initial returns. The most important contribution of their study in
terms of this thesis is the finding that the pricing problem is also sensitive to market-wide
conditions. In other words, as uncertainty is higher in the market, it makes it harder for both
investors and underwriters to value IPOs. The study does not however address the formation
mechanism of reference prices, which is my main focus. Still, motivated by these results, I
will incorporate initial return volatility into the empirical analysis by high tech industry and
microcapitalization variables, in addition to a lock-up period variable.
Information extraction theory states that IPO underpricing is the cost of obtaining private
information. Public information on the other hand is available costless before IPO price
has been set. Bradley and Jordan (2002) find that more than 35% of initial returns can
be predicted using public information available at IPO date, which cannot be explained by
9existing theories on IPO underpricing. Derrien (2005) studies, why the impact of market
conditions on the aftermarket price of IPO shares is only partially incorporated into IPO
prices. In his model, the aftermarket price of IPO shares depends on both private information
of the intrinsic value of the firm as well as on noise trader sentiment. He finds that at the
time of the oﬀering, public information on noise trader sentiment seems to be partly included
in the IPO price. This study further assumes that the noise traders are bullish, as the study
period is a hot issue period. However, this assumption leaves out the eﬀect of noise traders
during bear markets, which I intend to incorporate in my own analysis.
2.1.1 Underwriter price support
Underwriters buy shares from the aftermarket for the purpose of covering a short position
when allocating the shares. This is called underwriter price support in its principal form
(Kaustia, 2004). This means that the underwriter oversells the issue to have a short position
by e.g. exercising the overallotment option or by making aftermarket purchases.
Aggarwal (2000) finds underwriter support in half of the IPOs under investigation. According
to him, the most probable IPOs to be price supported are the ones with initial returns
equaling zero. Firms that exhibit higher initial returns are less likely candidates for price
support, whereas half of negative initial return IPOs seem to be price supported in the study
of Aggarwal (2000). In addition, price support has been found most frequent in larger issues
and higher oﬀer prices.
Additional findings from Aggarwal (2000) concern the price support period, which provides
evidence against the previous literature of a price support period during only the first few
days after the issue. In fact, most price support activities are found to last from 10 to 15 days
with 16% still being supported after 20 days of issue, as well as 6% that have support even
past 30 days.
The study of Ellis et al. (2000) finds that the underwriters accumulate inventory for the first
21 trading days when the IPO trades at or below the oﬀer price during the first 20 days, and
after a few days the inventory is actively reduced.
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Therefore, underwriters have been found to aﬀect the overall liquidity of the stock, though no
price bidding has been evidenced. Several other studies also contribute to this phenomenon,
sharing the observation of 20 days of price support period (Ellis et al., 2002; Hanley et al.,
1993; Boehmer, 2002). As most support activity has been found to occur at somewhat below
the oﬀer price, it is likely to aﬀect the trading volume e.g. when a positive initial IPO falls
below its oﬀer price for the first time. According to Kaustia (2004), this kind of support
can increase the trading volume especially in the range of 95-100% below oﬀer price, thus
distorting the results of the possible disposition eﬀect.
Guided by these previous studies, the guideline of only considering the trading volume period
after the first 20 post-IPO trading days, is executed in this thesis. Also, for reasons stated
above, the firms with zero initial returns are excluded from the empirical subsample.
2.1.2 Lock-up periods
Related to underwriter price support, the role of lock-up periods is addressed, because it
may influence the turnover patterns in the later analysis. The reasoning behind the lock-up
agreements is, that the owners of the firm going public typically sell about 15-20% of the
company, while the remaining shares tend to be subject to a lock-up period, under which the
buyers of these shares cannot sell their shares for a pre-specified time. The usual length for
this time period is 180 days. As the lock-up period expires, there is an observable change in
the number of shares in the market. Eﬀectively, the event of lock-up period ending is not
information-based, but rather subject to a pre-determined agreement. (Brav and Gompers,
2003)
As the lock-up period expires, Ofek and Richardson (2000) find a permanent drop in the stock
price while at the same time the volume of shares traded jumps an average of 38%. This means
that even though the price drop would be anticipated, the markets are not complying to this.
They mean that the price drop should have been incorporated in the price as early as even
on the first day after the IPO, because the lock-up period is known in advance. In reality,
the evidence on bid-ask spreads, short interests and tax considerations suggest no arbitrage
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opportunities. Exemplary of this is the decline of the price that is larger for stocks harder
to short and those with larger bid-ask spread. They also find that the price drop relates to
the stock’s volatility, which could act as a proxy for the owners of these shares wanting to
diversify their risks.
The role of lock-up agreements is assessed later by incorporating a lock-up variable in the
regression. It is beneficial to investigate, whether this agreement aﬀects the total turnover of
a firm, because even one large enough shareholder can have a decreasing eﬀect on the stock
return, if she is trying to remove all her holdings at one time. This may then cause further
implications for the trading volume.
2.2 Investor sentiment
Investor sentiment forms the roof for the later reference price formation analysis of this thesis.
Investor sentiment can be described as a belief on investments’ future returns and risks,
that cannot be explained by facts at hand. Modern behavioral finance suggests there are
limitations to arbitrage. Moreover, rational investors (or arbitrageurs) have been found to
be less aggressive, than the standard model would imply, in forcing market prices to their
fundamentals. This can be due to a fear of betting against sentimental investors, which can
turn out both risky and costly. (Baker, 2007)
The question is no longer pointed on whether investor sentiment aﬀects stock prices but rather
on how to measure its eﬀects and correctly quantify them. The study of Baker (2007) states
two ways of examining investor sentiment. The first approach is called the bottom up way
which is executed using investor psychology biases, including overconfidence and under- or
overreactions to past returns. Barberis et al. (1998) among others have developed models
like this concentrating on predictions on market-wide investor sentiment patterns as well
as their relation between stock prices and volume. The other approach by Baker (2007)
proceeds in a macroeconomic top down way, which assumes that real investors and markets
are too complicated to be analyzed and characterized by a few biases. This approach aims
to explain which stocks are most likely to be aﬀected by investor sentiment. These are the
12
same stocks as the right-hand side stocks of Figure 1. I intend to combine both approaches
by incorporating under- and overreactions, as driven by the market conditions, as well as
firm-based characteristics in evaluating what creates the market anomalies.
The behavioral model developed by Long et al. (1990) divides investors into two types that
set the prices in the market. The first are sentiment-free rational arbitrageurs and the second
are exogenous sentiment -prone irrational investors. Even the rational investors suﬀer from
short time horizons as well as costs and risks of trading and short selling. Therefore, both
types are subject to restrictions, which leads to stock prices diﬀering from their fundamental
values.
In this model, mispricing in the market can be either due to an irrational investor sentiment
change and/or to the rational investor arbitrage limits. Baker (2007) takes this model further
by constructing a setting on the hypothesis that while sentiment-based demand varies from
firm to firm, arbitrage is always equally diﬃcult with any firm. According to him, sentiment
increases are connected to speculative stocks with higher return expectations. E.g. during
a market bubble, speculative stocks that are diﬃcult to value are more sensitive to investor
sentiment. Additionally, these speculative stocks tend to be overall more costly to buy and
sell short, i.e. harder to arbitrage and the rational arbitrageur will withdraw. (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1995) Therefore, these speculative stocks tend to be the most aﬀected by investor
sentiment.
As stated in the beginning, various regularities in investors’ behavior have been documented to
dispute with the traditional theories on rational investors. On of the most surprising evidence
comes from the tendency of investors to sell winning stock too early whilst holding on to losing
stocks, called the disposition eﬀect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). There are four behavioral
elements in the disposition eﬀect: prospect theory, mental accounting, regret aversion and
self-control. Prospect theory explains the disposition to sell winners and keep losers when
the gains are held and not rolled over into another gamble. Mental accounting addresses
the conditions under which the disposition eﬀect holds when the gains from realization are
reinvested. Aversion to regret provides an explanation into why investors sometimes have
diﬃculties in realizing both gains and losses. Self-control is exercised when investors force
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themselves to realize losses.
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Figure 1
Theoretical Effects of Investor Sentiment on Different Types of Stocks
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Note: Stocks that are speculative and difficult to value and arbitrage will have higher relative valuations 
when sentiment is high. 
extreme growth are toward the right. The y-axis measures prices, with P* denoting 
fundamental values, which, of course, can vary over time. The lines then illustrate 
the basic hypotheses about how stock valuations are affected by swings in sentiment. 
High sentiment should be associated with high stock valuations, particularly for the 
stocks that are hardest to value and to arbitrage. Low sentiment works in the reverse 
direction. In the absence of sentiment, stocks are, on average, assumed to be 
correctly priced at P*. 
An empirical question that arises in the drawing of Figure 1 is where to locate 
the crossing point of this seesaw. One case (not in Figure 1) is that no crossing 
point exists: the upward-sloping high-sentiment line lies entirely above the no-
sentiment P* line, which in turn lies entirely above the downward-sloping low-
sentiment line. That is, when sentiment increases, all stocks’ prices go up, but some 
more than others. In this case, the aggregate effects of sentiment will be strong, 
because aggregate stock indexes are simply averages of the underlying stocks. 
As drawn, Figure 1 reflects the more complex case where the prices of 
particularly safe, easy-to-arbitrage stocks actually are inversely related to sentiment. 
This outcome could occur if sentiment fluctuations induce substantial changes in 
the demand for speculative securities, for example engendering “flights to quality” 
within the stock market. Such episodes may, controlling for any changes in funda-
mentals, reduce the prices of speculative stocks and at the same time increase the 
prices of bond-like stocks. In this case, the effect of sentiment on aggregate returns 
will be muted because stocks are not all moving in the same direction. 
Figure 1: Theoretical Eﬀects of Investor Sentiment on Diﬀerent Types of Stocks
Baker (2007) has divided investor sentiment based on diﬀerent types of stocks. The X-axis represents
the level of diﬃculty in valuating the stocks, whereas the Y-axis marks the prices of the stocks in
terms of their fundamental values. The lines represent the degree of investor sentiment in the market.
In Figure 1, bond-like stocks such as regulated utilities are included in the left-hand side,
while the right-hand side includes newer, smaller, more volatile, distressed or extreme growth
stocks. Accordingly, when s ntiment is high pe ulativ stocks will be exposed to higher
relative valuations. Correspondingly, as sentiment is low, safer stocks are valued more than
the riskier ones.
According to the classical theory of decision under risk, individuals tend to consider risk as
increasing with the magnitude and probability of potential losses. Decision theorists argue,
that as e variance in the probabili y distribution o po sible ou comes increas s, so does
the experience of a greater risk. According to Mongin (1997), instead of individuals viewing
options by their objective value, options are valued by their utility or ”moral value”.
This all bases on the fact, that decision makers are prone to choose the option that oﬀers
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them the highest expected value. Accordingly, if an individual is indiﬀerent in her decision
between a gamble and its expected value, she is considered risk neutral. The preference for
a sure outcome as opposed to a risky possibility of equal or higher expected value describes
the attributes of a risk averse person. Finally, a risk-seeking investor would rather take the
risk of uncertain outcome than to take a sure outcome. (Mongin, 1997)
2.2.1 Sentiment proxies
There exists several ways to measure investment sentiment. Possible proxies, as listed by
Baker (2007), include trading volume, IPO first-day returns, IPO volumes, mutual fund flows,
surveys, investor mood, retail investor trades, premia on dividend-paying stocks, closed-end
fund discounts, option implied volatility, insider trading and new equity issues. As retail
investor trades, surveys and investor mood concentrate on analysis of individuals, these will
not be further discussed in this paper. Instead, proxies that can be built on aggregate market
data are characterized briefly.
Trading volume has been used by several studies in describing sentiment eﬀects. Baker (2007)
finds that when irrational investors are optimistic, and when short-selling is costlier than long
positions, investors are more likely to trade and add liquidity. Additionally, the ratio of
trading volume to the number of shares outstanding can act as a proxy for market turnover,
which has been used to measure aggregate market sentiment swings. This method is applied
in my analysis as well, and further discussed in Section 4.
Initial public oﬀerings’ first day returns have been found to be highly correlated with IPO
volume and the relation between IPO underpricing and volume have been studied by e.g.
Ljungqvist et al. (2006) and Ritter (1984) Furthermore, IPO volume has been documented
to be sensitive to market fluctuations, as there exists hot and cold IPO periods. Several
studies, such as (Lee et al., 1991), (Neal and Wheatley, 1998), report evidence on closed end
funds’ average discount acting as a sentiment proxy, as the discount seems to increase as retail
investors are bearish.
According to standard finance theory, as the expected volatility of the underlying security
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increases, so do the prices of options. The market volatility index ”VIX” measures the options’
implied volatility on the S&P100 index. The VIX has can be used as a sentiment proxy as
it moves up as the market volatility, or uncertainty and fear, increases. (Whaley, 2008) This
index is applied for the benefits of my study and discussed more in the Section 4.3.2.
Mutual funds can be used as a sentiment proxy in measuring how investors move between
e.g. safer government bonds and riskier growth stock funds. Frazzini (2006) use mutual fund
flows as a proxy for sentiment towards individual stocks and find that a relation between the
funds’ inflows and the performance of the individual stocks within the fund.
2.2.2 Prospect theory
Prospect theory, first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is the leading behavioral
model of decision making under risk. The theory has been successful to explain a vast range
of empirical regularities such as market equity premiums, disposition eﬀect, and the attrac-
tiveness of participating in state lotteries. According to prospect theory, the marginal impact
of a change in probability decreases as the distance from relevant reference points diminishes.
According to prospect theory, investors are inclined into a disposition to sell winners and ride
losers when standard theory would suggest otherwise. Before making the decisions, investors
are prone to an editing stage, under which they mentally frame all their choices in terms of
potential gains (losses) relative to a fixed reference point. After this, investors experience the
evaluation stage, when an S-shaped valuation function, reflecting the risk aversion of gains
and risk seeking of losses, is employed. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) Figures 2 and 3
represent the visualization of the valuation function.
In this model, the function for gains takes a concave form, whilst the loss function is of
a convex nature. Generally, the status quo stands as the reference point that separates
gains from losses. Furthermore, the value function is steeper for losses than for gains, which
characterizes loss aversion. In other words, individuals typically require a larger compensation
to give up a possession than the initial purchase payment would have been.
Loss aversion occurs as, relative to a common reference point, the utility decline for a loss
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-   $10   -   $20   $0   
Sell and realize the loss
Do not sell  
Figure 1. Prospect theory, mental accounting, and the disposition effect: Realize a loss.
Assume that an investor purchased one share at $50 and the price is now $40. Suppose that in the
next month, the price could go either up $10 or down $10 (with equal probability). The investor
must choose between selling the stock now and realizing a paper loss of $10, or keeping the stock
in his portfolio. This figure shows the utility gain (loss) of the two alternatives.
The interpretation of this evidence is still highly controversial, as no unified
rational or irrational explanation has won general acceptance.2 Nevertheless,
there are some promising theoretical developments. Recent work by Barberis,
Huang, and Santos (2002), Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003), and Grinblatt
and Han (2005) integrates psychological evidence on typical attitudes to risk
into models of equilibrium prices. These papers suggest that preferences speci-
fications based on prospect theory andmental accounting can play an important
role in explaining asset pricing dynamics and the cross-section of stock returns.3
A combination of prospect theory and mental accounting (PT-MA) tends to
generate a “disposition effect,” that is, a tendency to sell securities that have
gone up not down in value since purchase. For example, assume that an investor
purchased one share at $50 and the price is now $40. Suppose that in the next
month, the price could go either up $10 or down $10 (with equal probability).
The investor must choose between selling the stock now and realizing a paper
loss of $10, or keeping the stock in his portfolio, in which case he has 50–50
odds of losing $20 and breaking even. A risk-averse investor will sell the stock.
An investor who is risk seeking on the loss domain, employing the purchase
price as the base (or reference price) to compute gains and losses, will not sell
the stock. This example is illustrated in Figure 1; the PT-MA investor prefers
the chance of breaking even to the certain pain of experiencing a loss.
On the other hand, assume that the investor purchased one share at $50 and
the price is now $60, again with a 50–50 chance of going up or down by $10.
2 See, for example, Fama (1998).
3 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Thaler (1985).
Figure 2: Underreaction to Losses Explained by Prospect Theory
The utility-gain(loss) of keeping a stock versus selling it. Eg. if the price drops from 30$ to 20$,
next it could equally go up by 10$ or down by 10$. The dilemma lies between realizing a paper loss
of 10$ now or keeping the losing stock. (Frazzini, 2006)
exceeds the increase in utility for a gain of same size. The other occasion where loss aversion
exhibits itself is when the gamble, that is determined always a loss relative to the reference
point, exceeds the utility of a certain loss of same mean, and vice versa for gains. Therefore, an
investor ight be ore likely to replace their risk-free asset with a risky asset as the utility
is locally concave (gain situation) than when the utility is locally convex (loss situatio ),
assuming a hypothetical market of a single risky asset. In a multi-asset market however,
reference prices do change and lead to replacement of a risky asset into a realized gain or loss.
(Grinblatt, 2002)
The term additionally incorporates the bias towards status quo by the tendency for relative
disadvantages of alternatives to attract more than the relative advantages (Samuelson, 1988).
This results in an inverse S-shaped weighting function, which describes the tendency to over-
weig t low probabilities and underweight moderate to high probabili ies. In other words, t
implies risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses.
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Figure 2. Prospect theory, mental accounting, and the disposition effect: Realize a gain.
Assume that an investor purchased one share at $50 and the price is now $60. Suppose that in
the next month the price could go either up $10 or down $10 (with equal probability). The investor
must choose between selling the stock now and realizing a paper gain of $10, or keeping the stock
in his portfolio. This figure shows the utility gain (loss) of the two alternatives.
In this case, a PT-MA investor will prefer the immediate realization of the $10
gain and he will sell the stock. This example is illustrated in Figure 2.
In this paper, I argue that the presence of a large subset of investors who
display the disposition effect can generate stock price “underreaction” to news
and, in turn, return predictability and post-announcement price drift. When
a stock experiences good news and increases in value relative to the purchase
price, these investors want to sell it to lock in the paper gain, which depresses
its price (assuming a downward-sloping demand curve). From that lower base,
subsequent returns will be higher. Therefore, good news tends to lead to high
future returns. Similarly, when bad news is released into the market and the
stock price goes down in value relative to the purchase price, disposition in-
vestors are reluctant to sell, absent a premium. In this case, any trading will
occur at a temporarily inflated price, and from that higher base, subsequent
returns will be lower. Hence, bad news tends to be followed by a negative price
drift.
To test this hypothesis, I propose a way to compute the aggregate basis for
individual stocks using data on actual stock holdings for a large class of in-
vestors, namely, mutual funds. I use a database of mutual funds holdings to
construct a time series of reference prices for individual stocks. I use this mea-
sure to construct a test of stock price underreaction to public news generated
by the presence of disposition managers. I test the hypothesis that the presence
of disposition investors hampers the transmission of information when firm-
specific information, such as an earnings announcement, is released, thereby
inducing a predictable price drift. The drift depends on the news content (pos-
itive or negative) and the difference between the current and the reference
price.
Figure 3: Overreaction to Winnings Explained by Prospect Theory
The utility-gain(loss) of keeping a stock versus selling it. Eg. if the price rises from 30$ to 40$, next
it could equally go up by 10$ or down by 10$. The dilemma lies between realizing a gain of 10$ now
or keeping the winning stock. (Frazzini, 2006)
According to prospect theory, when an individual is faced with two related outcomes, he can
evalu te them either separat ly r integrated as one outcome. Bec use the value function for
gains is concave, this results to the segregative treatment of two gains. (Loughran, 2002) In
other words, the investor gets a stronger winning feeling on two gains instead of one larger
gain.
When considering a gain and a loss, it depends on their magnitude, whether the investor tends
to segregate or integrate the two (Frazzini, 2006). This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure
4. For example, when there is a high net worth increase after a small amount of dilution, this
info matio is integrated and the i vestor feels better about the overall net gain. The y- xis
represents the amount of the underpricing magnitude, while the x-axis stands for the change
in market value between the filing date and the first closing market price. Thus, underpriced
issues, that are followed by an upward revision in the oﬀer price, are situated in the lower
quadrant on the right of Figure 4. Therefore, even though there is money left on the table,
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the integrated benefit to the investor is associated into a winning feeling.
Figure 4: Segregation vs. Integration in Financial Gain Experience
The regions of integration and segregation for an investor that receives both gains and/or losses
based on the fluctuations in valuation from the filing date to the first-day closing price and on the
amount of money left on the table. A large change in market value belongs to the right-hand corner
of the graph, while a large amount of money left on the table belongs to the lower-case region of the
graph. (Loughran, 2002)
2.2.3 Disposition eﬀect
Decision making under uncertainty has been explained by expected utility theory, which
states that people are believed to behave according to the the axioms of rational choice
(Neumann et al., 1944). However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found empirical evidence
that suggested people behaving irrationally, which lead them to develop prospect theory.
According to prospect theory, individuals take gambles inconsistent with the expected utility
maximization.
Investors have been reported to be inclined to preserve stocks which are not performing well,
even though market information would suggest otherwise. At the same time, reactions to
bad news concerning long-time well performing stocks cause investors to sell these winning
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stock more easily. Therefore, disposition eﬀect can be described as the tendency of individual
investors to hold on to losing stocks for too long, while realizing gains too early. The other
aspect includes investors avoiding risks when there exists a possible certain gain, and on the
other hand seeking risks when they are faced with possible losses.
This theory was further developed by Shefrin and Statman (1985) into disposition eﬀect,
thus linking it to investor behavior. Accompanied by unquestionable empirical evidence,
disposition eﬀect suggests prospect theory to prevail over expected utility maximization as an
explanatory model. By studying trading data during 1964-1970, Shefrin and Statman (1985)
found that approximately 40% of all transactions represent losses, regardless of the holding
time, which is inconsistent with tax advantage theories.
Lakonishok (1986) investigates tax-motivated investor behavior, and finds that the tax pre-
dictions are not consistent as the turnover seems to be higher for winners than losers, as the
disposition eﬀect suggests. Still, at year-ends, the motivation for tax-related gains succeeds
over other reasons for turnover increase. It would be beneficial to be able to distinguish the
diﬀerence between information-motivated trading and tax-motivated trading because this is
helpful to investors who invest based on trading patterns as a information source.
Disposition eﬀect has been studied in three diﬀerent methods: based on individual data,
such as socioeconomic background, experimental data attained from laboratory conditions or
through questionnaires, and finally by examining market-wide aggregated data, which will be
the basis for the empirical section of this thesis.
2.2.4 Overconfidence
One element explaining the disposition eﬀect has been suggested investor overconfidence.
Statman et al. (2006) describe the overconfidence hypothesis as a perception of the investor’s
ability to compete in the general marketplace for stocks.
Odean (1998) study suggests that investors are overconfident because they are incapable of
matching their investing skills to the realized gains. High market-wide returns make investors
overconfident on their own abilities. As the market turns down, losses reduce the trading
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volume and overconfidence level.
Statman et al. (2006) use a vector autoregressive and impulse-response function methodology
in investigating the trading volume implication of the overconfidence hypothesis. They find
significant evidence supporting the overconfidence hypothesis as well as the disposition eﬀect
of Shefrin and Statman (1985). They find that NYSE/AMEX stocks’ trading activity is
positively correlated to past shocks in market return and the turnover response last for months
or even years. There is therefore an increase (decrease) in market-wide trading activity
after bull (bear) markets. In other words, the overconfidence of noise traders increases as
they attribute high returns in bull markets to their trading skills. Statman et al. (2006)
additionally discover that individual security trading responds even more to past shocks,
which they interpret arising directly due to overconfidence hypothesis. Fama (1998) however
describes the market eﬃciency as still valid and declines several points about the lack of
eﬃciency stemming from over- and underreaction of investors to new information.
2.2.5 Attention hypothesis
Another explanation for holding losers too long and realizing winners early is the attention
hypothesis. According to Barber and Odean (2007), investors are prone to give attention
selectively to upcoming new information. Corroborate attention hypothesis states that as
individuals are faced with numerous alternatives, they tend to prefer those that have caught
their attention.
2.2.6 Mental accounting
Thaler (1985) introduced the concept of mental accounting in order to explain the behavioral
consumer choice theory. Mental accounting uses the notion of a value function, first used
in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and incorporates price straight in the
function, which leads to the concept of reference price. The disposition eﬀect describes how
investors keep a separate mental account for each stock whilst maximizing their reference-level
based value function within that account. (Kliger and Kudryavtsev, 2008)
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Shefrin and Statman (1985) study the eﬀect of emotions such as pride and regret on trading.
According to them, investors hold separate mental accounts associated with each stock they
hold. In this setting, the realization of gains is accompanied by pride whereas the realization
of losses is followed by emotions of regret. Investors as human beings logically prefer feeling
pride, which leads to a quicker sell of winners, while the realization of losers is postponed to
avoid the feeling of regret.
2.3 Investor sentiment and market conditions
Investor sentiment has been empirically documented to be aﬀected by market conditions.
Under a bear market, investor sentiment is typically low, while the market conditions are
quite volatile. Under these circumstances, earnings visibility is also lower, which causes
diﬃculties in estimating the fair value of stocks. (Arkes et al., 2008)
According to Brown and Cliﬀ (2004), there are two types of traders in the market, the fun-
damentalists and the speculators. Fundamentalists have unbiased expectations of an asset’s
value, whereas speculators valuate assets with a bias. When the speculators value the intrin-
sic value greater (smaller) than the current price, they are bullish (bearish). Consequently,
bullish investors expect, in addition to a positive return, a greater return than the funda-
mentalists’ required rate of return. Measuring these deviations from the intrinsic value is not
easy. Therefore, Brown and Cliﬀ (2004) employ the bullish term when the expected price
increases and bearish as it declines, which acts as the framework for my analysis as well.
There is some supporting evidence of market conditions-driven impact on reference point for-
mation in the field of psychology. Recent studies, including Arkes et al. (2008), Karlsson et al.
(2009), Arkes et al. (2010), have modeled this eﬀect through vast questionnaire experiments
by simulating a real investment decision. These studies measure, what magnitude of utility
an individual experiences from recent stock price changes, while given distinct information
on the historical stock prices. These studies do not however provide evidence on a aggregate
market level reference price formation.
Arkes et al. (2008) finds that reference point adaption is found to be occurring more with
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rising stocks than the falling ones, which makes it asymmetric. This study also suggests that,
as the investors on average have more winning stocks than losing ones during rising markets,
their reference point adaption is also faster.
Derrien (2005) examines the impact of favorable investor sentiment on the pricing, initial
return and long-term performance of IPO stocks. The study bases on a particular data
source, comprising 62 oﬀerings in the French stock exchange. The focus is kept knowingly on
the demand of individual investors, and the study finds that IPOs tend to be priced over their
long-run intrinsic value, but yet do exhibit positive initial returns. Additionally, it seems that
the demand of the individual investors is positively correlated with initial return and turnover,
and strongly correlated with market conditions. He explains the underpricing phenomenon
therefore as a consequence of the noise trader sentiment. Still, the specific consequences
the market conditions cause on the reference prices are not characterized, as Derrien (2005)
focuses more on the relation between the demand curves of individual investors and the pricing
of IPO shares.
Investors are more likely to experience success in bull markets as the attribution bias exhibits
an asymmetric property and is more present in the bull conditions (Odean, 1998). In other
words, the self-enhancing attribution for success is more significant than the self-protective
attribution for failure. Diﬀerent market conditions can therefore provide a natural experiment
to measure the disposition eﬀect and whether bull markets cause investors to trade excessively,
over selling the losers.
It has been found that when investor sentiment increases, the oﬀer size of IPOs grow at
the same time (Ljungqvist, 2003). In addition, the quality of the average issuer decreases
as companies are increasingly more likely to get listed on non-investment purposes such as
financing previous debt. Ljungqvist (2003) also argues that lock up-provisions are demolished
earlier for corporate insiders in case of unexpectedly high investor sentiment, after the excess
inventory of regular investors has been unloaded, or at the turning point of the hot market
into a cold direction.
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2.4 Reference point formation
According to the disposition eﬀect, investors’ tendency to sell winners and hold losers is
due to the concept of a reference point which determines the losses from gains (Shefrin and
Statman, 1985). Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008) were the first to be able to empirically prove
the mechanism of reference point formation. According to their study, salient events during
a stock’s holding period do aﬀect their investors’ perceptions, which causes them to update
the stock’s reference point.
Reference prices in behavioral finance are considered to be a function of past purchase prices
of a financial asset (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Studies such as Odean (1998) and Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001) have used the weighted average price as a proxy for the reference price.
Other studies have applied the first purchase price or the most recent purchase price as a
reference point. (Weber and Camererb, 1998; Frazzini, 2006) Finally, some studies, mostly
those that do not have the information on the initial purchase price, use historical peaks as
reference prices (Kliger and Kudryavtsev, 2008). Gneezy (2005) studies the eﬀects of prior
losses and gains on the formation of reference prices, and on the contrary finds that historical
peaks tend to be the most descriptive reference prices that investors base their decisions on.
One could argue that there is a considerable amount of investors who do not follow the price
movements of their investments. Still, the market trading volume is so large, that even if a
percentage of all investors changed their reference points according to these news, it would
aﬀect the trading volumes. (Kliger and Kudryavtsev, 2008) Additionally, after IPOs, investors
are expected to follow the events even more closely. Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008) also find,
that events in firms with a higher beta cause more reference point formation. Higher beta
implies higher exposure to market volatility. Therefore, the relation between turnover and
market volatility could be one determinant of the reference price formation.
Investors may update their reference prices more easily with smaller firms, as they possess
low information flow and analyst coverage (Kliger and Kudryavtsev, 2008). Smaller firms are
also more diﬃcult to value, which is due to the fact that they demonstrate more idiosyncratic
variance, plus they are more costly to buy and sell short, which makes them harder to arbitrage
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1995). How the disposition eﬀect is connected to all this is through the
fact that in the beginning the smaller firms may experience even long periods of negative
earnings, but still have a potential for future larger returns. If the investors are conscious of
this, they may keep the losing stocks in waiting for the future price peaks.
2.5 Methods used in previous studies
The existing past research on prospect theory and disposition eﬀect can be divided into three
categories based on the source of their data: aggregate market data, individual data, and
experimental data. Studies based on each are linked to the IPO underpricing and explained
the relevance and the need for further research.
2.5.1 Aggregate market data
The study of Lakonishok (1986) was the first to use aggregate market data as a basis for
the disposition eﬀect analysis. They find significant evidence from historical stock prices on
winners having a stronger abnormal trading volume than losers.
Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008) discovered, that firms’ quarterly earnings announcements in-
fluence reference point formation when the analysts’ earnings forecasts are unable to predict
the prices accurately. Additionally, they found that market price reactions followed the earn-
ings announcements, and that smaller sized firms with higher betas caused a stronger reaction
in the reference point formation. Therefore, it seems reference point formation process is more
reactive to company-specific events when there is less information on the market and as the
prices are more sensitive to market fluctuations.
Kaustia (2004) studies the disposition eﬀect through IPO trading volume. He is able to point
out that turnover is significantly lower for negative initial IPOs when the stock trades below
the oﬀer price. Additionally, it increases profoundly on the day the price exceeds the oﬀer
price for the first time. This increase is documented to last for two weeks. Furthermore, new
maximum and minimum stock prices seem to aﬀect reference point formation as they increase
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the trading volume significantly. Additionally, Kaustia (2004) did not find a significant asym-
metry observable at zero initial returns, which would support the disposition eﬀect during
the first trading day. This can be due to price support, which is described in further detail
in Section 2.1.1.
A stock’s fundamental value is unpredictable because it follows a random walk. Still, it is
found that the stock’s equilibrium price tends to underreact to information. Because of the
disposition eﬀect, there is a spread between a stock’s fundamental value and its market price.
The fundamental value is here referred to the stock price that would exist in the absence of
a disposition eﬀect. (Grinblatt, 2002)
Barberis et al. (1998) studies the eﬀect of a positive earnings shock. Underreaction means
that on average the stock price does not react suﬃciently to this shock, leaving the price
below fundamental value. In this model, it is assumed that investors base their decisions on
two alternative models. The first model implies that investors are mean-reverting and are
expecting the returns to deviate from the previous announcement. The other model suggests
that after consequtive announcements into the same direction (positive/negative) investors
are inclined to make their forecasts based on a trend they think of observing. Barberis et al.
(1998) argue in their model that firms’ earnings announcements represent information of low
strength but possesses high statistical weight. This is one explanation into why stock prices
underreact to earnings announcements (and other similar events). Furthermore, their study
implies that series of consistent patterns of news are experienced more strongly but actually
possess low statistical weight. Thus, patterns of good or bad news are argued to lead to stock
price overreactions.
According to Lee and Jiang (2002), the magnitude of the changes in how the noise traders
perceive the asset’s risk impacts expected returns via shifts in their sentiment. Accordingly,
noise traders usually have poor market timing, as they are inclined to transact together with
other noise traders. The greater the misperception, the greater the capital losses. Lee also
finds, that excess returns are positively correlated with shifts in sentiment. Furthermore,
bullish shifts in sentiment lead to downward revisions in return volatility and implies higher
future excess returns.
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Lowry and Oﬃcer (2010) find evidence on the interconnectedness of the IPO pricing problem
and market-wide conditions. Market-wide uncertainty makes it harder for underwriters and
investors to value IPOs. Market conditions can also drive firms’ decisions to go public (Pa´stor
and Veronesi, 2005). What is yet to be determined however, is whether market conditions
aﬀect the behaviour of the aggregate market in terms of turnover changes. In other words, is
investors’ behaviour dependent on the prevailing market conditions. This is addressed in my
study.
Ljungqvist (2003) study the relation of IPO long-run performance and investor sentiment pri-
marily in a hot market. They find that underpricing and long-run performance are negatively
correlated as in Ritter (1984), but their study contributes the correlation to only hold when
the probability of the hot market ending soon remains small. While an interesting finding
regarding the eﬀect of the market conditions on the long-run performance of an IPO, this as-
pect will be left out of this thesis because of concentration on the eﬀects of market conditions
on the short-run market trading.
Finally, as Statman et al. (2006) states, several studies on individual investor transactions
have found evidence of disposition-prone individual behavior. In fact, this suggests a specific
behavioral attitude towards the stock market in general. Therefore, these investors under
inspection are likely to overestimate their abilities in active buying and selling of securities
of stocks in general, rather than only on the specific holdings under research. Therefore, the
best way to measure overconfidence or the disposition eﬀect would be to use aggregate trading
volume data.
2.5.2 Data on individual investors
Odean (1998) studied the disposition eﬀect by analyzing the trading records of 10,000 ac-
counts of a large discount brokerage house. According to this study, investors are found to
demonstrate a significant preference for realizing winning stocks rather than the losing ones.
Moreover, they prove that investor behaviour is also strongly aﬀected by tax-motivated selling
especially in the end of each year.
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Additionally, the motivation of the investors was found unrelated to both avoidance of trading
costs of low priced stocks and to the desire to rebalance portfolios. Moreover, many investors
engage in tax-motivated selling, which occurs especially in December. Shefrin and Statman
(1985) also note this eﬀect and explain it by the fact that investors sell their losers in the
end of the year because of a self-control measure. In other words, they hypothesize that
investors recognize the tax benefits of selling losers, while without a similar kind of reasoning
are reluctant to realize the losses.
Frazzini (2006) finds that when the investors have a tendency towards disposition eﬀect, there
is a post-event price drift because the prices underreact to news. When the stock price ap-
preciates as a result of good news, investors want to sell it to lock in the paper gain, which
on its turn pushes down the price, assuming a downward-sloping demand curve. This study
was done by investigating fund managers and discovered that the lower-performing profes-
sional investors were as prone to the disposition eﬀect as the individual investors. According
toTversky and Kahneman (1992), people pay too much attention to the strength of informa-
tion (evidence) exposed to them and too little attention to its statistical weight when making
forecasts about the future performance of their investments.
Ranguelova (2001) studies the daily trading records 78,000 clients of a discount brokerage
house. The results indicate that the disposition eﬀect concentrates primarily on large capi-
talization stocks. In fact, she finds that the stocks which are trading at the smallest 40% of
the market capitalization actually exhibit eﬀects of the reverse kind to the disposition eﬀect,
as investors keep winners and sell the losers.
Grinblatt (2002) argue the disposition eﬀect creates a spread between a stock’s fundamen-
tal value and its market price. In this case, the fundamental value is the stock price that
would exist if there was no disposition eﬀect. Their study finds that the disposition eﬀect
may empirically aﬀect the tendency of past winners to outperform past losers. They base
their research on the hypothesis that if some investors are prone to disposition eﬀect, the
stocks with aggregate unrealized capital gains correspondingly outperform the stocks that
posses aggregate unrealized capital losses. Furthermore, their study finds that the correlation
between past returns and variables related to the disposition eﬀect might be the drivers of
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stock returns’ momentum.
According to attribution theory, individuals too strongly attribute events justifying their
actions to high ability whilst the opposite events are seen to arise from external noise or
sabotage factors. Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) argue that investors may be trading based on
private signals which they afterwards reflect to public signals. In this case, good news raises
investors’ confidence but bad news only modestly decrease it. In other words, the public
signals are on average considered as confirming the validity of the investor’s private signal.
Therefore, public information may trigger further overreaction. Their study finds that this
kind of continuing overreaction causes momentum in security prices, but in the long-term the
price is drawn back closer to fundamental value as more public information occurs.
2.5.3 Experimental tests
As general in finance empirical research, there are less studies made based on the experimental
design. This does not however mean, that these studies present controversial results, but they
are rather laborous projects with many considerations.
Bloomfield (2002) finds empirical evidence on the model developed by Barberis et al. (1998),
according to which investors use the past trend reversals of stock prices when determining
their estimates of future reversals (regime-shifting). They find that investors tend to overreact
to a price reversal when there has been but a few reversals prior to the last. On the other
hand, when the number of reversals has been high, the investors seem to underreact to recent
price reversal.
Weber and Camererb (1998) conducted a multi-stage experimental test to determine whether
individuals under an imaginary investing setting act according to the hypotheses of the dis-
position eﬀect. The subjects of the experiment were tested on buying and selling shares in
six risky assets, with the prices fluctuating throughout the experiment. Their results evi-
denced that the subjects did sell winning and keep losing stocks, which is in contrast with
the Bayesian optimization theory.
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Arkes et al. (2008) studies the reference price formation through an experimental design. He
conducted a laboratory study for undergraduate students and tested whether the asymmetric
adaptation after gains or losses holds when faced with monetary incentives and also whether
the incentives influence the reference point adaptation. Their results indicate that reference
point adaptation applies more completely to gains than to losses. They also find that the
adaptation (upwards) is done more quickly, if a stock is repurchased at the same price at
which it was sold before. They hypothesize this stems from the closing of the prior mental
account.
3 Hypotheses
The methodology of this thesis bases itself on the work of Kaustia (2004). Initially motivated
by the study of Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008), who use earnings surprise as a proxy and
compare the stock market reaction accordingly to the observed earnings level versus analytics’
forecast levels, I have replaced the earnings announcements with initial public oﬀering’s first
trading date returns and the analysts forecasts with the oﬀer price. Therefore, the initial oﬀer
price to the investors acts as a reference point, to which investors compare all forthcoming
price movements.
Based on the existing literature described in the previous sections, there is not enough sig-
nificant evidence on the eﬀect of market conditions on the reference price formation of the
aggregate market.
My research question is therefore the following:
Do stock market conditions aﬀect the aggregate market reference price forma-
tion?
In order to investigate this, I firstly intend to study the impact of the disposition eﬀect on
the post-IPO turnover. Regressions are run to determine the variables that represent the
most significant implications for reference price movements. To find out the solution for the
ultimate research question, I have formed the following pre-conditioning hypotheses, which
will be researched to first identify the model as valid.
I start by examining the reaction of the aftermarket on IPO pricing. This part is based on
the changes in trading volume after the underwriter support period has ended. Thus, IPO
trading volume is used as a proxy for investor sentiment. My analysis lies on the much studied
assumption of the investors’ reference price being the initial purchase price, i.e. the oﬀering
price of the IPO. The results of the further regressions will however incorporate other options
for reference prices, which will be explained in Section 6.1.1. Before that, I will next go
through the hypotheses.
As the disposition eﬀect states, investors tend to hold on to losing investments and sell winners.
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Hence, trading volume should be lower when the price is trading below the oﬀer price and
higher when the price surpasses the oﬀer price for the first time. According to Kaustia
(2004), this would represent a strong enough behavioral bias. Moreover, investors that are
disposition-prone and have not sold their shares previously, tend to delay their decision to
sell. IPO shares that have not previously traded above the oﬀer price should exhibit this
eﬀect at its strongest.
Moreover, when investors are reluctant to trade losers, trading volume should be higher when
the stock is trading above the oﬀer price vs. below it (Kaustia, 2004). This is because investors
are prone to realize winners. If the oﬀer price is indeed a reference price, the disposition eﬀect
should lead to a higher trading volume when the stock is trading at a higher price level in
relation to its initial oﬀer price. This leads to the first set of four hypotheses, that serve as a
precondition of the market condition based analysis:
H1: Post-IPO trading volume is higher in the price levels above the oﬀer price
H2: Trading volume for negative initial return IPOs increases when the oﬀer price is surpassed
for the first time
H3: Trading volume for positive initial return IPOs increases when the oﬀer price is surpassed
for the first time
H4: When new price maximums (minimums) are reached, trading volume increases
When the IPO market price with a negative initial return exceeds the oﬀer price for the first
time, there should be an immediate eﬀect in terms of trading volume. This will answer the
question, whether disposition eﬀect is significant enough to aﬀect asset pricing. Moreover,
due to price support reasons, as explained in Section 2.1.1, trading volume should increase
slightly below the oﬀer price for winners, and then again decline. Furthermore, other reference
prices are considered in addition to the oﬀer price, in order to detect the implications the new
maximum and minimum prices have on the total turnover of the stock.
A counter-argument could suggest that the more time it takes to surpass the oﬀer price, the
less initial investors there are left, and thus the eﬀect might not be as strong because of fewer
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investors share a common purchase price anymore. However, Kaustia (2004) argues that the
initial investors’ disposition might be even stronger within more time as they want to sell to
realize their winnings.
After these first hypotheses, I test the market condition induced eﬀects on the reference price
formation via the shifts in the post-IPO trading volume. These two hypotheses are designed
to provide the answer for the research problem:
H5: Market conditions (bullish/bearish trends) aﬀect the reference price formation
H6: Reference price formation is more frequent under bull markets
As stated before, trading should occur less in bear markets because of valuation diﬃculties.
This reasoning is backed-up by Derrien (2005), who argues, that noise traders (individuals)
only participate in the aftermarket when they are bullish. When they are bearish, higher
transaction size implies institutional investors to be responsible for aftermarket trading. Ac-
cordingly, I hypothesize that investor sentiment is less observable under bear markets, as
there are fewer noise traders. Therefore, the active adaptation of reference prices should be
faster and more volatile during bull markets, than during bear conditions. Naturally, hypoth-
esis number 5 acts as a presumption for hypothesis number 6, as the testing of the latter
gains meaning only on the verification of the fact that reference price formation indeed varies
according to market trends.
Finally, as per the research of Barber and Odean (2007), Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008) and
Frazzini (2006), there should be more reference point updating with stronger surprises. More-
over, reference points tend to be adapted more after rising stock news rather than declining
(Arkes et al., 2008). Therefore, I test whether the size of the underpricing, which acts as the
surprise element for the investor, has implications on the trading volume.
H7: Large initial returns cause more reference point adaptation
Now that the hypotheses are stated, the means to resolve them are characterized thoroughly
in Section 4.
4 Methodology
In this section, I discuss the methods applied in the empirical analysis. Essential methods
include both individual daily firm regression analysis and pooled regression analysis. The
purpose of the first regression is to develop a model for a normal turnover. The residuals
from this regression represent the abnormality of the daily turnovers of individual firms.
These residuals are then further analyzed by the pooled regression method, to determine the
main factors that cause the total turnover to deviate from its normal values.
4.1 Regression analysis of daily turnover
The first-stage regression will be performed for each firm individually. The characteristics for
these are described in Section 5. Before this, the methodology and variables of the regressions
are explained.
To estimate the turnover behaviour of the subsamples, I first form a model of normal turnover
for each firm. The turnover is estimated from post-IPO dates between 160 and 484 according
to the following equation:
Vi = α1 +Xiβi + ei (1)
where,
Vi= Ti x 1 vector of log of firm i daily turnover
αi= regression constant for firm i
1= Ti x 1 vector of log ones
Xi= Ti x m1 matrix of first step explanatory variables for firm i
βi= m1 x 1 vector of regression coeﬃcients for firm i
ei= Ti x 1 vector of error terms for firm i
Abnormal turnover for each firm is determined by controlling for market turnover, previous
days’ turnover, contemporaneous and lagged returns and seasoning eﬀects. Abnormal trading
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volume is measured according to Kaustia (2004), in accordance with Tkac (1999), by dividing
the number of shares traded by the number of shares outstanding (Vi in the above equation).
This turnover ratio data is extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database files separately for each firm. The regression variables following the methodology of
Kaustia (2004) and their explanation are displayed in Table 1.
Following the study of Lakonishok (1986) and Ferris and Haugen (1988), market turnover is
measured by a simple average of all the companies turnover presented within the analysis. In
the first regression, turnovers serve as the dependent variable and the market turnover is one
of the independent variables, with disturbance terms representing the abnormal turnovers.
According to the below regression equation, the daily data of each individual firm is used to
determine the coeﬃcients of the turnover market model.
Tkac (1999) determines the market model turnovers as follows:
V Tit = αi + βiV TMt + eit
where,
V Tit = the turnover of security i in month t
V TMt = the relevant market turnover in month t
eit = the disturbance term for company i in month t
This formula is then further developed to identify the abnormal turnovers, which are defined
after the following equation:
AV Tit = V Tit − (αi + βiV TMt)
In the analysis, these residuals are divided according to the sign of the initial return and
thus belong to either the winning stocks or the losing stocks. Whereas the above-mentioned
studies employing this method use a dataset of four years of stocks already listed for several
years, my study concentrates instead on newly-listed companies over a period of two years
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Table 1: Regression Variables for the Dependent Variable of Daily Logarithmic
Turnover
Explanatory variables used in individual firm regressions. The objective is to model the normal
turnover of each firm, with the dependent variable being the logarithm of daily turnover (number of
shares traded/ number of shares outstanding).
Variable Description
Volume variables
Market turnover Log of Aggregate number of shares traded divided by the
aggregate number of shares outstanding
Turnover Log of Number of firm i shares traded divided by the number
of shares outstanding
Turnover (-1) Log of Turnover at day n− 1 relative to observation day
Turnover (-2) Log of Turnover at day n− 2 relative to observation day
Seasoning variables
Time Time in months relative to oﬀer date
Time2 Time in months squared
Stock return variables
R Daily log stock return
Max [R,0] If positive, the return, otherwise zero.
-Min [R,0] If positive, zero, otherwise absolute value of return.
Volatility The daily stock return squared
R (-1) Stock return at day -1 relative to observation day
R (-2) Stock return at day -2 relative to observation day
following the study of Kaustia (2004). The motivation as explained comes from the known
oﬀer prices of IPOs, which act as the first anchoring point for the disposition eﬀect.
The estimation periods of the individual firms can overlap to some extent. However, following
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the research design of Kaustia (2004) should mitigate against any cross correlation eﬀects.
Even if volume is correlated with both contemporaneous and lagged returns, the model should
remove most systematic eﬀects because it already includes the return based variables in addi-
tion to market volume. The return variables take in all the market information aﬀecting the
distinct firm. Therefore, as the signals to the IPO market specific trading volume are cor-
related with the contemporaneous and lagged returns, or market volume, the cross-sectional
impact on the residuals should be minimal.
Furthermore, my analysis does not take the model of the study of Kaustia (2004) only as a
given, but tests other variables before the first regressions, that may be aﬀecting the normal
turnover. These variables are explained in more detail in Section 6.1.1.
4.2 Pooled regression analysis
In this section, the method of pooled regression analysis is described and its fit is justified for
the later forthcoming empirical analysis. First, the panel data method is explained and based
on its implications, the pooled OLS method of the second-stage regressions is accounted for.
4.2.1 Panel data regression
A panel data consists of i number of individuals, each with n sets of observations. According
to Matyas and Sevestre (2008), the panel is said to be balanced if every individual is observed
equally many times. Analogously, an unbalanced panel may contain individuals that are
observed diﬀerent numbers of time. Furthermore, the panel is fixed, if for the whole duration
of the study, there is the same set of individuals. Therefore, the panel data for this study is
an unbalanced one.
Panel data method is applied in this study, because it takes into account the time varying
nature of the data. Broadly determined, panel data can be regressed in three main methods:
pooled, fixed and random eﬀects. Pooled regression should be used when the individual eﬀects
contain only observable features that can be determined to represent the constant.
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If there are some possibly unobservable features that are correlated with the model, the
least squares estimator will be biased and inconsistent, and one should use the fixed eﬀects
regression model instead. This model estimates the constant as a group-specific term within
the regression model. Fixed refers to the non-stochastic correlation of the individual eﬀects
and the constant with the whole model. Time-invariant variables cannot be estimated by the
fixed model, as they will mimic the individual specific constant term. (Matyas and Sevestre,
2008)
If however, the unobserved individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the model variables,
the regression model should be based on a random constant term, taking into account the
random eﬀects. Whether the unobserved individual eﬀect of the firms have features that are
correlated with the regressors in the model is the key distinction between fixed eﬀects and
random eﬀects models. The Hausman test can be performed to test whether the variables are
correlated with the constant or not. (Matyas and Sevestre, 2008)
There are no time-invariant variables in the second-stage regressions of this study, so the
random eﬀects estimator is not considered. Furthermore, as the data ought to be unaﬀected
by any underlying unknown variables, as I am measuring only the relation between return
and turnover, the proper model should be the pooled OLS-regression. Also, the intercepts at
the pooled model are assumed to be identical, which fits the analysis in this paper, as the
residuals should represent the abnormal deviations from the normal turnover. Therefore, the
analysis is done in the same way as the one conducted by Kaustia (2004).
4.2.2 Pooled OLS
As mentioned, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on the residuals obtained from
the previous regressions. This enables me to detect the size of behavioral eﬀects. Following
Kaustia (2004), the individual error terms ei form the dependent variable Y as follows:
Y = Zβ + ￿ (2)
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Y = [e1e2...eN ], Z = [Z1Z2...ZN ]
where,
Y= vector of stacked error terms ei
Z= matrix of second step explanatory variables
Zi= Ti x m2 matrix of second step explanatory variables
β= m2 x 1 vector of regression coeﬃcients
￿= m2 x 1 vector of error terms
To determine important reference prices, I will measure the total turnover after IPO. Initial
return is measured as the percentage change from the oﬀer price to the first closing price. The
turnover is measured from the twenty-first day of trading onwards. This procedure is followed
according to Kaustia (2004) and Lowry and Oﬃcer (2010) in order to avoid the eﬀects of price
support. I use the exceeding prices in relation to the oﬀer price, by describing the events as
follows: A crossing of the oﬀer from below at a level of 1.10 corresponds to the stock price
yield of more than 10% to initial investors.
A set of dummy variables is used to indicate crossings of specific stock price levels, new
high and low prices and trading within specific price ranges. All variables for the pooled
regression are displayed in Table 2. The variable that indicated the first crossing of the oﬀer
price, gives losers the value of 1 when the stock price crosses the oﬀer so that it surpasses
above it. Correspondingly, winner stocks have to cross below the oﬀer price to get a value
of 1. Furthermore, other price levels are initiated for the purpose of control variables. These
dummies represent levels of 0.95, 1.00,...,1.50 for the losers and 1.20,1.15,...,0.80 for winners.
Additional dummies include variables, which indicate the new maximum and minimum stock
prices over the previous 20 trading days.
There might be an additional distorting factor that has to be taken into consideration, namely,
the new investors who buy the initial investors’ increased supply of shares at oﬀer price and
sell them only above the oﬀer level. In other words, when the trading increases close to the
oﬀer price, this may lead to an increase in volume at the corresponding price. Therefore, a
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dummy indicating the crossing after the first crossing is introduced both at the same price
levels as described before as well as further levels of 0.70, 0.75,...,0.90.
Table 2: Explanatory Variables of the Pooled Regression.
Pooled regression is run to determine the magnitude of the behavioral eﬀects. Dependent variable
is obtained from the residuals of the first regression.
Variable Description
Record High 1M Previous -month -high dummy
indicating 1 if the highest
value occurred during past 20 trading days, otherwise 0
Record Low 1M Previous -month -low dummy indicating 1 if the lowest
value occurred during past 20 trading days, otherwise 0
First Crossing Dummy variable indicates 1 if the stock return
Above Level X index crossed the level xx relative to oﬀer price from below
for the first time, otherwise 0. E.g. First Crossing 1.10
contributes the value of 1 on the day the stock price for
the first time crosses the level of 1.10 in relation to the
oﬀer price, thus surpassing above the initial price
First Crossing Dummy variable indicates 1 if the stock return
Below Level X index crossed the level xx relative to oﬀer price from above
for the first time. E.g. First Crossing 0.90 contributes
the value of 1 on the day the stock price for the first time
crosses the level of 0.90 in relation to the oﬀer price,
thus surpassing below the initial price
Second,...,Nth Dummy variable indicates 1 if the
Crossing of Level X stock return index crossed the level x relative to oﬀer price
from below, or above, otherwise 0
Range [X1, X2] Dummy variable indicating 1 if the stock
price is inside the price range, otherwise 0. E.g.
Range [1.10, 1.15[ gets the value of 1 every day the stock
return index is trading at a gain between 10% and 15%
in relation to the oﬀer price, and a value of 0 otherwise.
Record High 1M Interaction dummy between the record high price
(R≥ 5%) and (R≥ 5%), indicating 1 whenever the return is equal
or larger than 5%.
Record Low 1M Interaction dummy between the record low price
(R≤ 5%) and (R≥ 5%), indicating 1 whenever the return is equal
or smaller than -5%.
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The abnormal volume of the stock’s trading range is also measured without considering the
crossing of any of the price levels. For this purpose I include dummies of a particular range
relative to the initial oﬀer price. Exclusions in the ranges include the class of [1.00,1.05[ for
both the winners and the losers, as this range serves as a benchmark.
4.3 Pooled regression based on market conditions
Market conditions on each firm going public will be tested within this second regression
with an additional segmentation of the firms, the dividing basis indicating for bull and bear
markets. The methods and variables correspond to the afore-mentioned ones, only diﬀering
in the segmentation preassumptions. To determine the bull and bear markets, I use both the
VIX-index and a means of technical analysis called the MACD method, which are described
next.
4.3.1 Moving average convergence-divergence (MACD)
MACD is a form of technical analysis and is one of the most simple and eﬀective momentum
indicators. It is constructed by calculating moving averages of diﬀerent-lengths. Chong and
Ng (2008) study daily closing prices using the relative strength index and the MACD.
EMAt = [
n
2
· (Pt − EMAt−1] + EMAt−1
where,
EMAt = exponential moving average at time t
n = number of periods for EMA
In this formula, the initial EMA is the n-day simple moving average (SMA) of the series. The
most common time periods used in this analysis are 12 and 26 days. (Chong and Ng, 2008)
However, because of the brief nature of these periods, I will extend the periods in my analysis
to better represent the longer periods of my study. I will use periods of 2 years and 230 days,
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which correspond to the same relation as the 12 and 26 day periods.
Essentially, these moving averages are considered as trend-following indicators which the
MACD then turns into a momentum oscillator. This indicator is particularly good in identi-
fying past market signals, and should be investigated by following the signal line crossovers
and divergences. Figure 5 represents the MACD graph, modeled on data on the S&P500
index extracted from Thomson One Datastream.
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Figure 5: S&P500 Modeled with the MACD Method
Convergences and divergencies of the S&P500 index. As the moving averages cross, converge and
diverge, the MACD fluctuates on both sides of the zero line. The zero line detects the market trend
reversals. Data is extracted from Thomson One Banker. Time window runs from 1 January 1996 to
31 December 2011
Convergence is said to occur as the moving averages move towards each other, whereas diver-
gence means the averages moving away from each other. The zero line is called the center line,
which detects the trend reversals. As the MACD line moves above and below the center line,
it means the shorter moving average has crossed the longer moving average, positive values
indicating the shorter being above the longer average and vice versa. As the shorter moving
average diverges further up, it indicates an increase in upside momentum. Correspondingly,
downside momentum occurs as the shorter moving average diverges down from the longer
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moving average. (Campbell et al., 1998)
The MACD analysis also entails a signal line, which is typically calculated the 9-day EMA of
the MACD-line, or in my analysis, the 174-day EMA of the MACD-line (calculated keeping
the same overall relation between the time periods). Because the signal line is a moving
average of the indicator, it facilitates the follow-up of MACD turns. In fact, the most imporant
contribution of this analysis to my study is its capability to detect bullish (bearish) crossovers
of the MACD as it crosses the signal line from below(above). (Chong and Ng, 2008)
The MACD line can be calculated both on individual securities as well as on indices. Following
the study of Chong and Ng (2008), I model MACD based on the S&P 500 index, because it
best describes the market conditions of my base sample. Furthermore, the motivation behind
the 2-year longer moving average lies in the idea, that the initial volume data on the individual
firms in my sample has the same length.
4.3.2 VIX-index
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Market Volatility Index (VIX) is implied from
the S&P500 index options on a real-time basis each trading day (Whaley, 2008). It serves
as an estimate for the short-term expected return volatility. The index is not backward-
looking but rather represents the volatility that has only recently been realized. VIX can be
considered as a fear index in a way that it reflects the anxiety in the markets. Whaley (2008)
explains that the VIX tends to peak during market turmoils, and as the volatility increases
the investors demand higher returns for their stocks which cause the prices to fall. He also
finds that when the stock market falls, the VIX tends to rise at a higher absolute rate as
opposed to the situation where the market rises.
As investors become bullish it raises the market risk as they are holding riskier assets, which
also increases expected returns. The converse eﬀect happens in bear markets. (Lee and Jiang,
2002) This explains why the index that describes the volatility in the market can be a sign of
bull/bear markets. Such an index is the VIX-index, which measures the volatility of options.
VIX is used in this study as a benchmark sign on the prevailing market trends, or market shifts,
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CBOE Market Volatility Index (VIX) During 1 Jan 1996- 31 Dec 2011 
Figure 6: CBOE Market Volatility Index
VIX index estimates the short-term expected return volatility within the market. Peaks in the index
can be considered signs of increased market anxiety. VIX is modeled based on the S&P500 data
extracted from Thomson One Banker. The time period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December
2011.
if you will. As it has been empirically tested to represent the sentiment shifts, it provides a
proper estimate for especially the downturn points in the markets. Figure 6 illustrates the
VIX index for the time period under inspection.
In this study, VIX is compared to the MACD-line as a reassuring measure of the validity of
the MACD-method. The two give a coherent and non-concurring estimate on the past market
shifts. These shifts are then used to determine the prevailing market conditions on each day
of the following period of each firm. In fact, these estimates are used to divide the firms of
subsamples into “Bull” and “Bear” categories later in the pooled regressions in Section 6.3.
4.4 Regressions based on the size of the initial returns
The last regressions are run based on the size of the initial returns. These regressions comply
with the same variables and methods as with the second-stage regressions described before.
The only diﬀerence is, the winners and losers are further divided based on the size of the
initial returns. Accordingly, the winner firms of the largest 40 percent diﬀerence between
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the oﬀer price and the first-day closing price are marked as the largely underpriced and the
rest are put in the average underpricing category. The segmentation is done in accordance
with Ranguelova (2001). For the losers, this procedure is performed in the same way, but
accounting the first group for the largest 40% in overpricing and the rest belonging to the
average overpricing category.
5 Data
In this section I describe the data retrieval process along with the main characteristics of
the full and the subsamples, as well as the prevailing market conditions during the IPOs of
these firms. The full dataset consists of 2849 US IPOs, which are then further divided into a
subsample of 1527 firms for the regression analysis purposes.
5.1 Description of the data retrieval process
The full data comprises U.S. initial public oﬀerings listed in the Thomson One Securities
Data Corporation (SDC) database. The time period continues directly from the ending of
data period of Kaustia (2004) and spans eﬀectively from 1 January 1996 to 31 December
2011. All data on oﬀer dates and prices, in addition to gross proceeds are matched both with
data in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Thomson One Banker.
The data retrieval process goes as follows. Initially the SDC data retrieval gives 10,674 IPOs
in the US during the time period under inspection. The data is next sorted to better fit for
the purposes of this study. Following the study of Loughran (2002), exclusions include unit
oﬀerings, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), partnerships, and American
depository receipts (ADRs). Additionally, only original IPOs are considered, so later issues
made by the same firms under the same period have been excluded. After these eliminations,
the amount of IPOs drops to 4,732 firms. Furthermore, all IPOs under an oﬀer price of $1 a
share (263 firms) have been excluded.
In measuring the reference price formation, I use Thomson One Banker as a primary source for
extracting the stock price and volume data following the post-IPO 2-year period. The sample
firms are matched with Thomson by tickers and are all tracked over a maximum period of 484
trading days, which corresponds to two years on both stock return and trading volume. The
number of shares outstanding after the issue are gathered from CRSP database. To match the
information of the sources I employ the CUSIP numbers to identify the issuer. Because the
time period ends in December 2011, for an amount of 322 firms going public in 2011, the stock
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data is truncated at 1 September 2012, leaving out about 84 days amount of observations for
the last IPO of 2011. Firms that have less than 160 trading days tracking data available,
have been excluded, as well as firms, which lack more than 15 days of information on trading
volume. After all eliminations, the data consists of 2,849 IPOs
5.2 Sample characteristics
Following the study of Kaustia (2004), the sample is divided into three categories based on the
sign of the initial return of the first public oﬀering. Accordingly, the categories representing
the full sample are called “winners”, “losers” and “neutrals”. The winners correspond to IPOs
of positive initial returns, losers to negative initial returns and logically the neutral sample
exhibits no diﬀerence in the first trading day’s return relative to the oﬀer price.
5.2.1 Full sample
The yearly number of IPOs is displayed in Figure 7. First observations can be made by
comparing this e.g. to the MACD Figure 5: IPOs do indeed seem to be clustered in hot and
cold periods, which follow market fluctuations.
As mentioned, the final sample includes 2,849 firms. Out of these, 2281 have positive initial
returns, 523 negative initial returns and 45 trade at zero return. This corresponds to 18.3%
of IPOs having negative initial returns, which are labeled as “losers”. Correspondingly, 80.1%
have positive initial returns and will be marked as “winners”. The remaining 1.6% of firms
had a zero initial return (i.e. they are trading at oﬀer price at first closing). Zero return can
be due to price support, which was described in 2.2. On average, the full sample losers are
smaller with a median market capitalization of $288.2 million, as the figure for all firms is
$348.5 million.
Additionally, the relation between losers’ gross proceeds and all firms’ proceeds is about the
same as the market capitalization relation. Average number of IPOs of the full sample firms
per day during the 15 year period is 1.64, with a median of 1. Maximum number of IPOs per
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Figure 7: The Full Sample Distribution of IPOs
The aggregate number of initial public oﬀerings divided by the sign of the initial return and by the
occurrence between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 2011.
day was 11, while the minimum was 1. The mean and median market capitalization for all
subsamples is presented in Table 5.
5.2.2 Subsample
For the purpose of reference price eﬀects, I form further subsamples from the full sample.
This segmentation is done by tracking the fluctuations of the stock prices in terms of the oﬀer
price. In other words, losers which stock price crosses the oﬀer price from below for the first
time only after four weeks (20 trading days), form one subsample. Correspondingly, I form a
subsample from winners by the stock price that crosses the initial oﬀer from above since the
21st trading day. Eﬀectively, the crossing of the oﬀer level occurs on any date between 21
and 484 days after the listing date. Zero eﬀect group is assumed to be under price support,
which is why it is not included in the further analysis.
Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of the subsample data. Out of the 2849 firms, 449 meet
the requirements of the loser subsample, whereas 1028 are chosen for the winner subsample.
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Figure 8: The Subsample Distribution of IPOs
The aggregate number of initial public oﬀerings divided by the sign of the initial return and by the
occurrence between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 2011.
As it can be seen, the subsample graph resembles the aggregate distribution of the full sample
quite closely. Therefore the subsample should be adequately formed in relation to the initial
sample. The only diﬀerence is, the relation of losers to the aggregate number of IPOs is
somewhat larger for the subsample. This is, however, a benefit for the purposes of this study,
as there is more data available for the losers, which balances the results in terms of number
of observations.
Table 3: Statistics for the Subsample under Lock-up Agreement
Descriptive statistics for the winners and losers of the subsample, that are subject to a lock-up
arrangement. Information has been gathered from SDC database.
Winners mean median stdev min max all
No. of lock-up days 200.0 180.0 104.8 30 730 731
% of shares under lock-up 63.1 68.0 23.0 2 100 273
Losers mean median stdev min max all
No. of lock-up days 98.8 90.0 101.8 36 540 275
% of shares under lock-up 64.0 67.0 21.7 3 100 89
An additional input to the study brings the incorporation of information on lock-up agree-
ments, market trends, firm size and belonging to a high tech industry. I have gathered data
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from the SDC on lock-up days and on relative amount of shares under lock-up provision. As
described in Section 2.1.2, lock-ups may aﬀect the turnover of the individual firms, which
justifies their incorporation into the analysis. As it can be seen from Table 3, the mean and
median number of lock-up days seems to be substantially larger for winner firms (mean 200,
median 180) as opposed to the losers (mean 99, median 90). As stated in Section 2.1, in a
longer time period, the initial losers tend to overperform the winners. Therefore, these figure
suggest that having longer lock-up agreements may essentially hinder the performance of the
firm. This is however, a question of long-run performance, which is not within the scope of
this paper. The purpose of this variable is instead to act as a part in determining the normal
volume for each firm in the first regression in Section 6.1.1.
Table 4: Statistics of the Supplementary Variables
Statistics on firms that belong to a hightech industry and on firms that are smaller than $200M
in market capitalization, divided by the prevailing market trend at the time of their first public
oﬀering. The variables are used in the preliminary regression in Section 6.1.1
Additional variables Winners Losers
Bull Bear All Bull Bear All
Hightech 173 105 278 66 29 95
MicroCap 116 44 160 60 22 82
Market trend at issue 712 316 1028 332 167 499
Moreover, I have used the market capitalization data retrieved from the SDC to identify
microcapitalization enterprises, because, they may be potentially reversing the disposition
eﬀect, as suggested by Ranguelova (2001). Table 4 describes the characteristics for both the
winner and loser subsamples in diﬀerent market conditions. The relative amount of winners
during a bull period corresponds to the relative amount of both hightech and microcap firms
under bull markets, when compared to the whole amount of winners during this period. The
same applies to the losers as well, so there are no surprises in these ratios.
From SDC, I also got information on the firms’ industries, which I used to identify high-tech
firms. This was done by sorting the firms under the SIC-codes registered under the high-tech
category. The stock market trends I have estimated using the VIX index together with the
MACD method, as described in Section 4.3.2.
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Initial returns of the subsample are displayed in Table 5 together with other descriptive
statistics. The initial return equals the percentage diﬀerence between the aftermarket price
on the 1st day of trading and the oﬀer price. The tracking of trading volume, which is used
in the second regressions, on the other hand begins at day 21, strongly due to price support
bias. This adjustment is consistent with the studies of Kaustia (2004), Lowry and Oﬃcer
(2010), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001).
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Samples Divided by Initial Return Type
Statistics are given for both the full sample of 2849 firms as well as for the subsample of 1527 firms.
Full sample is divided based on the sign of the initial return into winners, losers and neutrals, and
the subsample correspondingly into winners and losers (excluding the zero eﬀect firms). The time
period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011
Full Sample Oﬀer Initial Proceeds, Oﬀer Market % shares
year return $M price cap, $M oﬀered
Winners
(n= 2281)
Mean 2002 23.21 % 193.07 14.03 2 545.65 44.73 %
Median 2001 7.24 % 69.20 14.00 402.56 40.00 %
St. Dev 5.1 25.01 % 403.05 8.13 609.75 18.06 %
Losers
(n= 523)
Mean 2001 -6.46 % 95.24 15.88 1 573.83 44.47 %
Median 1999 -3.52 % 50.10 17.00 288.18 42.12 %
St. Dev 4.7 14.33 % 141.88 9.39 651.60 21.07 %
Neutrals
(n= 45)
Mean 2002 0.00 % 84.49 15.59 1 121.30 47.66 %
Median 2000 0.00 % 50.00 11.63 227.48 44.21 %
St. Dev 5.4 0.00 % 93.02 5.55 385.89 27.44 %
All
(n= 2849)
Mean 2002 10.63 % 147.09 14.45 1 821.10 45.05 %
Median 2000 6.99 % 57.50 13.00 348.45 41.19 %
St. Dev 5 20.70 % 359.11 7.79 403.56 28.99 %
Subsample
Winners
(n=1028)
Mean 2003 23.14 % 162.16 13.24 2 534.51 46.67 %
Median 2004 15.45 % 64.00 13.00 361.60 43.07 %
St. Dev 5 24.20 % 307.29 7.80 347.17 16.76 %
Losers
(n=499)
Mean 2001 -9.68 % 65.84 15.59 1 567.21 41.64 %
Median 2000 -5.50 % 37.05 17.00 267.58 34.05 %
St. Dev 4.8 6.81 % 101.64 8.16 270.40 29.25 %
6 Empirical results
In this section, the results of the methodology driven regressions are assessed. First, the
results of the descriptive data analysis are characterized. This is followed-up by the pooled
preliminary analysis, which assesses the fit of additional variables into the first-stage regres-
sions. Based on the results of the preliminary regression analysis, the base case first-stage
and second-stage regressions are performed. The base-case regressions are run according to
the framework of the study conducted by Kaustia (2004). After this come the regressions
based on the prevailing market trend during the time of the issue. Finally, the size eﬀects of
the initial returns are measured and reported through the same regression methods.
6.1 Descriptive analysis
Before the first regressions, the statistics for the variables are calculated. These are displayed
in Table 6, which represents the pooled firm days of 1028 winners and 499 losers. Notable is,
that the average absolute trading volume of the winners is over twice as large as the losers,
which could imply that losers are traded less, in line with the disposition eﬀect. In estimating
the market turnover, the firms overlap 173 days on average, with a median of 170 days. The
maximum number of days for the firm observations is 484.
Table 6: Summary Statistics of the Daily Return and Turnover Variables of the
Subsample
Summary statistics on the daily return and turnover are calculated from the pooled firm days of
1028 winners and 499 losers in the subsample. The volatility variable is proxied by squared returns,
following the methodology of Kaustia (2004). Each firm contributes to the statistics covering the
first two years of trading data (excluding the first 20 days). Observation time period runs from 1
January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Winners Losers
Variable Mean Median St. Dev Mean Median St. Dev
Turnover 0.64 % 0.42 % 2.55 % 0.54 % 0.39 % 1.91 %
Turnover, R>0 0.77 % 0.85 % 0.38 % 0.75 % 0.94 % 1.03 %
Market turnover 0.40 % 0.90 % 0.2097 % 0.44 % 0.34 % 0.28 %
$-trading volume 1,067,089.36 130,800.00 2,078,044.05 409 066.94 67 673.50 2,193,555.09
$-trading volume, R>0 1,397,339.10 167,300.00 5,406,721.70 1,078,711.01 130,291.00 5,676,810.70
R 0.13 % 0.00 % 6.05 % 0.17 % 0.00 % 4.40 %
R, R>0 3.42 % 1.90 % 5.41 % 4.87 % 1.79 % 6.75 %
R, R<0 -3.47 % -2.02 % 5.67 % -3.09 % -1.80 % 6.97 %
Volatility 0.37 % 0.02 % 1.47 % 0.19 % 0.02 % 1.93 %
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Figure 9 represents the initial returns and first-day median turnovers divided by initial return
category. As it can be seen, for winners the turnover seems to increase with large positive
initial returns. The losers’ turnover on the other hand seem to increase both below the oﬀer
price and above it, which would be inconsistent with the disposition eﬀect. However, this
is only the first day turnover. It could be, that some noise investors drop the loser shares
immediately, which would mean the disposition eﬀect is not a good fit for the first-day investor
behavior when it comes to the losers. Furthermore, the price support activities may influence
the total turnover, as explained before.
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Figure 9: Initial Returns and Turnovers of the Winners and Losers
First trading day turnovers divided by initial return size, estimated separately for the positive initial
return firms (1028 winners) and the negative initial return firms (499 losers). The lower graphs
illustrate the average turnovers with an added 3-period moving average calculated from the turnover
values. Time period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Figure 10 illustrates the whole subsample together, with a polynomial trend line attached.
Here the line does support the disposition eﬀect theory, as the overall trading seems to decrease
below the oﬀer price, and increase above it. Therefore, at first glance it would seem that the
oﬀer price does act as a reference price, steering the turnover at both sides of it.
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Figure 10: Initial Returns of the Whole Subsample
First trading day turnovers divided by initial return size, estimated for the whole subsample of 1527
firms combined. The lower graph illustrates the average turnovers with a polynomial trend line
attached. Time period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
In order to learn more about the relation between the initial return size and the reference
point formation, these issues are returned to in Section 6.4, where the groups are further
divided based on the size of the initial returns and regressed accordingly.
6.1.1 Preliminary regression
Before the individual regressions, I run a random estimator regression for both groups in
order to perform a supplementary first-stage analysis. The analysis is not performed on the
pooled OLS estimator, as there are categorical variables present at this stage. Moreover, this
model assumes there can be additional unknown factors that are not observable but aﬀect
the total outcome. As I am intending to estimate the determinants of normal turnover, this
is a suitable estimator for these purposes. The results are displayed in Table 7.
This analysis provides more insight into what variables are statistically significant in terms of
the turnover. As it can be seen, significant impact is made on behalf of market turnover, time
since oﬀer, time squared, maximum and minimum prices, and volatility. The determinants
of previous days’ returns do not seem to significantly impact the turnover, but are however
incorporated into the model in order to keep the variables coherent with the study of Kaustia
(2004).
To find out, whether more factors aﬀect the turnover of shares, I have incorporated 4 addi-
54
tional dummy variables: Hightech, Market trend at issue, Microcap, and Lock-up expiration.
For example, underwriters tend to have diﬃculties in valuing small, young and high-tech com-
panies. Motivated by this, I incorporate a variable pointing out the hightech companies to the
preliminary regression, which describes the riskiness eﬀect that this variable has on turnover.
As hypothesized before, these firms are expected to possess more risks and can therefore aﬀect
the total turnover. The data is collected from Thomson Financial SDC and is matched by
hightech SIC-codes. Other variables include the micro-capitalization variable, detecting the
eﬀects of firms smaller than $200 million. The Microcap variable follows the same logic as
the Hightech variable, as small firms are expected to be riskier. Additionally, market capi-
talization can have an eﬀect on reference point formation: low market capitalization stocks
may induce a diﬀerent eﬀect on the reference point formation updating. The lock-up period
variable measures the possible turnover eﬀect of an expiring lock-up agreement, and finally
the market trend variable tests, as a preliminary measure, whether the market conditions
have significant implications on the overall turnover and can act as a segmentation basis for
the second-stage regressions.
Out of the categorical variables, hightech, microcap and market trend at issue seem to have
a strong statistically significant eﬀect on the turnover of the winners. However, for the
losers, there are no statistically significant diﬀerences, except for the market trend eﬀect.
Accordingly, the additional variables cannot be further utilized in the first-stage regression
in the following sections. Still, the losers results can be interpreted by the magnitude of the
probabilities, even though not statistically significantly. This way, it can be seen that the
maximum return, time since oﬀer, volatility and market trend at issue time represent smaller
probabilities of finding these results in a random distribution. What is most important,
the variable of market trend is significant at a 95% level, which suggests a good fit for the
segmentation basis in the market trend generated regression sections.
In order to determine the normal turnover for winners and losers, I will not however incorpo-
rate the market trend variable in the first-stage regression. One reason is that, as explained
in Section 4.1 on the cross correlations, the variables of the normal turnover model should
detect any market movements and reflect them into the prices. Therefore, the base model for
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Table 7: First-stage Random Estimator Regression Results for Individual Firms
Regression coeﬃcients are calculated based on the random estimator regression on the firms pooled
in the winner (1028 firms) and loser (499 firms) subsamples. Coeﬃcients represent the sign and
magnitude of the eﬀect on the normal turnover of the firms. Sample period runs from 1 January
1996 to 31 December 2011.
Winners Losers
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Market turnover 0,23851 15,49670 *** 0,63632 0,51820
Turnover -1 day 0,00000 -0,36220 0,00001 0,11330
Turnover -2 days 0,00000 0,09900 0,00000 0,05400
Time since oﬀer -0,00004 -2,90940 ** -0,01903 -0,62150
Time sqrt 0,00107 2,67040 ** 0,00117 0,99030
Maximum return 0,20001 18,20520 *** 1,40810 1,52040
Minimum return 0,25637 23,38750 *** 0,37003 0,40030
Volatility -0,03540 -11,46070 *** -0,19764 -0,81300
Returns -1 day 0,00020 0,85050 0,00739 0,35790
Returns -2 days 0,00003 0,08770 -0,00004 -0,00480
Hightech 1,37000 18,10400 *** 140,90000 0,50800
Market trend, day 1 1,61000 21,22400 *** 717,20000 2,58600 **
MicroCap 1,01000 13,40400 *** 103,60000 0,37300
Lock-up period 0,00573 0,47620 -0,00239 -0,00190
Adj. R2 19,50 % 18,20 %
No. of firms 1028 499
Max no. of firm observations: 484
the normal turnover will follow the one employed by Kaustia (2004). Still, the preliminary
model does oﬀer significant implications for the diﬀerent market trends. Hence, the eﬀect of
the market conditions cannot be left without attention, as they seem to impact both winners
and losers turnover. To investigate this more, I will later in Section 6.3 divide the winners
and losers based on the prevailing market trend at issue and run the second-stage regressions
based on these groupings, to investigate whether the conditions play a role in the reference
price formation.
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6.2 Base case regressions
After defining the determinants of the normal turnover model, the next step is to run the
regressions accordingly for each firm in both subsamples. This analysis contains individual
first-stage regressions, that serve as the basis for the second-stage pooled OLS regressions,
following the methodology of Kaustia (2004), as explained in Section 4.
6.2.1 First-stage daily regressions
Table 8 represents the average regression coeﬃcients with t-values for initial winner and loser
firms. The residuals that are obtained from these individual regressions are used later as the
dependent variables for the pooled regressions. The idea behind the first regressions is to
model the normal turnover model, by taking into account the lagged and seasonal eﬀects.
The results of the individual regressions mostly follow previous research. As it would be
expected, the turnover for the winners seems to grow, whereas the turnover for the losers
declines, when they are unaﬀected by all other variables. This is a first sign of the disposition
eﬀect as winners are realized but losers kept, ceteris paribus. These first-stage regression
results also show that the variables increasing share turnover the most seem to be market
turnover, the previous days’ turnover, and new price maximums and minimums. Significant
relations lie between turnover, stock return, market turnover and the volatility. This is
coherent with previous research.
As the time since the oﬀer increases, the turnover seems to decline, which is in line with
the study of Kaustia (2004). Further similarities include the volatility seeming to decrease
the turnover of losers, however diﬀering in the increasing nature of winners turnover in my
study and decreasing in his results. In his model, volatility decreased both winners and
losers turnovers, and this was discussed to be fighting with the results of previous research
on evidence of a strong positive correlation between turnover and volatility. Still, following
the instructions of Kaustia (2004), I will keep the volatility as a part of the first model, even
if it is negative for losers. After all, as this variable is proxied by squared returns in both
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Table 8: Average Results of the Individual Firm Daily Turnover Regressions
First-stage regressions use the logarithm of daily turnover as the dependent variable. The sample
consists of winners (1028 firms) that cross the oﬀer price level from above and of losers (499 firms)
that cross the level from below for the first time between 21 and 484 days during the sample period
from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Winners Losers
Average t-values Average t-values
Turnover (Constant) 0,0705 0,117 -0,5046 -1,110
Market turnover 0,6304 0,189 0,5799 0,871
Turnover -1 day 0,0001 0,703 0,0000 2,176
Turnover -2 days 0,0001 0,859 0,0003 0,478
Time since oﬀer -0,0001 -0,640 -0,0739 -1,027
Time sqrt 0,0019 0,666 0,0028 1,029
Maximum return 0,2470 0,000 2,1611 0,968
Minimum return 0,2657 0,211 1,1548 0,803
Volatility 1,3202 0,749 -2,1204 -3,496
Returns -1 day 0,0147 0,710 -0,1262 -1,438
Returns -2 days 0,0187 0,582 -0,1502 -0,736
Adj. R2 28.9 % 30.1 %
No. of firms 1028 499
Max no. of firm observations 484
studies, it can only be considered as a rough estimate on the underlying standard deviations.
Still, as hypothesized in Section 3, under more volatile market conditions the turnover should
decrease, as investors find it harder to value the assets. This provides an additional reason
into, why the subsample will be later divided by the market conditions, in order to learn
more about this potential influence, and whether the losers’ turnover actually decreases more
during the more volatile periods.
Furthermore, as the previous days’ returns increase, the turnover of losers seems on average
to decline, which can be due to investors wanting to wait for the actual crossing of the initial
reference price. However, these lagged returns’ eﬀect is not of significant nature at this stage
of the analysis. They are however kept for further purposes for the development of the next
step model. With winners, the previous days’ returns grow the turnover, which is consistent
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with previous research.
The seasoning variables, time and time squared, are not significant factors in the whole model,
but are kept as a means of detrending the turnover series, in order to guarantee stationarity,
a precondition in the regression analysis.
Because these are only average statistics, the results cannot be interpreted yet to an em-
pirically reliable extent, but they provide a preliminary impression on the matter. Overall,
according to the coeﬃcients and their t-values, the parameters seem to be quite similar for
both subsample groups, which would imply that the model can be well applied for further
analysis.
6.2.2 Second-stage pooled regression for winner firms
Second-stage pooled regressions are used firstly to define the determinants of abnormal turnover,
measured by the residuals of the first-stage regressions, and secondly to model the reference
price formation. Each regression is performed separately for the winner and loser groups.
The results of the base case and interaction incorporated pooled regressions for winners are
displayed in Table 9.
Statistically significant factors aﬀecting the abnormal turnover of winners are record high
prices, as well as record low prices and low prices that decline more than 5%. In both models,
the intercept itself is significant at a 90% level, and implicates a decline in turnover, if all
other variables remain unchanged. The coeﬃcient is nevertheless quite small, and therefore
almost indistinguishable from zero, so no governing truths can be derived out of this result.
Surprisingly, record high prices larger than 5% do not seem to have a statistically significant
eﬀect, and the results suggest that beyond this threshold trading decreases, maybe due to
positive expectations about further price rise. This could also imply that investors do realize
winners faster when new record high prices are met, but if the rise is large enough, investors
hold on to the winners. However, the coeﬃcient is again quite small, so the interpretation is
only speculation at this point. Record low prices on the other hand are not significant, until
they fall beyond the 5% level. Taking this into account, investors seem to lay oﬀ realization
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when the price drops enough. This is logical in terms of the disposition eﬀect, as the initially
winning stock essentially loses with the fall.
Table 9: Daily Pooled Turnover Regression Results for Winners
The sample of 1028 firms consists of winners, that cross their oﬀer price from above for the
first time between 21 and 484 trading days. The residuals from regression 1 (see Table 8) are
held as the dependent variable. The base case regression only accounts for the record high and
low factors, while the second regression includes the interaction variables of the magnitude of
the record high and low prices. The sample period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December
2011.
Base Case HI/LO interactions
Variable Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept -0.0081 -16.9919 . -0.0079 -16.843 .
Record High 1M 0.0396 35.8770 *** 0.034 32.8091 **
Record Low 1M 0.0041 4.2970 0.0158 16.871 .
Record High 1M (R>5%) -0.0087 -2.417
Record Low 1M (R<5%) -0.0705 -32.674 **
First Cross Below 1.20 0.0148 1.0420 -0.0014 -0.1020
First Cross Below 1.15 0.0556 3.3460 0.0697 4.1910
First Cross Below 1.10 -0.0856 -5.1990 -0.0643 -3.9000
First Cross Below 1.05 -0.0764 -4.2690 -0.0629 -3.5130
First Cross Below 1.00 0.0376 2.8040 0.0497 3.7060
First Cross Below 0.95 0.1083 6.5000 0.1338 8.0200
First Cross Below 0.90 0.0740 4.2910 0.0786 4.5510
First Cross Below 0.85 -0.0961 -5.3980 -0.0825 -4.6300
First Cross Below 0.80 -0.1066 -6.1280 -0.0754 -4.3290
Second Cross Below 1.20 0.0491 4.4810 0.0495 4.5140
Second Cross Below 1.15 -0.0412 -3.6900 -0.0202 -1.8090
Second Cross Below 1.10 -0.0424 -3.7710 -0.0236 -2.0940
Second Cross Below 1.05 -0.1217 -10.3910 -0.1048 -8.9350
Second Cross Below 1.00 -0.0383 -3.3670 -0.0274 -2.4040
Second Cross Below 0.95 0.0334 2.8390 0.0470 3.9940
Second Cross Below 0.90 -0.0216 -1.8070 -0.0096 -0.8030
Second Cross Below 0.85 -0.0864 -7.0780 -0.0652 -5.3360
Second Cross Below 0.80 -0.0578 -4.5010 -0.0384 -2.9820
RANGE [0.00, 0.70] 0.0914 7.3000 0.1284 10.2180
RANGE [0.70, 0.75] 0.0171 1.3870 0.0394 3.1800
RANGE [0.75, 0.80] 0.0183 1.0980 0.0112 0.6710
RANGE [0.80, 0.85] 0.1219 7.2360 0.1280 7.5950
RANGE [0.85, 0.90] -0.0123 -0.7580 0.0039 0.2370
RANGE [0.90, 0.95] -0.0692 -4.3260 -0.0665 -4.1560
RANGE [0.95, 1.00] 0.1600 12.5960 0.1586 12.4800
RANGE [1.05, 1.10] 0.1769 12.5950 0.1679 11.9410
RANGE [1.10, 1.15] 0.2126 20.6552 * 0.2211 21.5099 *
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RANGE [1.15, 1.20] -0.0138 -1.0960 -0.0082 -0.6550
RANGE [1.20, 1.25] 0.0063 0.6120 0.0021 0.1970
RANGE [1.25, 1.30] 0.0562 5.4120 0.0440 4.2330
RANGE [1.30[ -0.0338 -3.7270 -0.0262 -2.8890
R2 0.62 % 0.82 %
No. of observations 497552 497552
No. of variables 33 35
Although the results of the crossing variables do not seem statistically significant, I have
assessed the directional and size of impact eﬀects that the variables have on the turnover, i.e.
are they increasing or decreasing the turnover and by how much comparing to other variables.
As the stock price for the first time declines below levels 1.10 and 1.05, it has a declining eﬀect
on turnover, which is not consistent with Kaustia (2004). In his study, the whole group of first
crossings cause a positive movement on the turnover, whereas my results suggest that right
before the price drops below its suspected reference price, the eﬀect turns into an incentive
for the investors to momentarily rather hold on to the declining stocks, than sell them. This
could further imply that the reference price has changed upwards as the stock initially began
trading at a new all-time high, and as the stock falls, investors are reluctant to realize it.
Crossing the oﬀer price (level 1.00) changes the direction again, as the once winning stock
trades below its oﬀer price, which seems to increase realization. This is consistent with the
hypothesis, that as the oﬀer price is passed, the turnover increases, which was described to
partly originate from the price support actions. Still, below level 0.85, the stock has fallen
as much that it does appear to reduce the trading, which is consistent with the disposition
eﬀect.
The second crossings do not either provide statistically significant implications. However, the
same pattern as in the first crossings can be seen from Figure 11. In the second crossings
the decreasing nature of trading starts already at the level of 1.15 (i.e. at a gain of 15% in
relation to the oﬀer price), whereas the turnover decline in first crossings starts at the level
of 1.10. Additionally, the level of 0.95 of the second crossings is the only level that results
in increased realization of the stock. In fact, falling below the level of 0.95, and increasing
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the turnover could be a direct implication of price support activities, as described in Section
2.1.1. Furthermore, where Kaustia (2004) had all his second crossings variable coeﬃcients
negative, mine seem to move in the same manner as the first crossings, but remaining overall
below the first crossings line. This would suggest that as the price crosses the reference price
for the second time, the eﬀect is rather a decline in turnover than an increase.
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Figure 11: Winners’ Price Level Crossings
First and second crossings of the oﬀer price level represent the turnover eﬀect of the coeﬃcients of
the winners’ pooled regression. E.g. at the level of 0.95, the turnover is aﬀected by a log increase of
0.1083, which is the coeﬃcient value of the first crossing below level 0.95.
The ranges variables roughly follow the crossings’ coeﬃcients. Trading at the range of [1.10,
1.15] gives a statistically significant implication of an increase in trading volume. Below
this, trading faces increasing eﬀects, until the price is in the range between 0.90 and 0.95,
after which it turns negative. This follows the initial hypothesis of keeping a losing stock.
However, the ranges provide additional information below the following crossings, as it seems
that stocks trading below 0.80 are in eﬀect realized and not kept, not like the disposition
eﬀect would assume.
Furthermore, each time a first-time crossing occurs, it is at the same time a one-month low,
which causes the price range to change. Therefore, to get the total eﬀect from crossing the
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oﬀer price level for the first time, one has to sum up the coeﬃcients for Record Low 1M,
First Cross Below 1.00 and the change that is caused from changing the price range from
[1.00, 1.05[ to [0.95, 1.00[. This yields to a 24.2% increase in total turnover. About 3% of the
turnover increase is explained by the new record high price, 80% by the price range change
and 17% from crossing the reference level for the first time.
6.2.3 Second-stage pooled regression for loser firms
The results of the pooled regression for losers are displayed in Table 10. Statistically significant
results for the losers are obtained solely with the variable describing the eﬀects of record high
price over 5%. Unlike the study of Kaustia (2004), my results seem to decrease the turnover
as this record high price is reached. It seems that investors are reluctant to realize the losers
as they reach new record high prices. This result is somewhat controversy, for the disposition
eﬀect would suggest a realization of the better performing stock. The diﬀerent results between
these two studies can stem from the diﬀerent time periods of the samples. For example, in my
data, there exists the overheated hot IPO period of the late 1990’s, which could have aﬀected
my results. Examining the correlations in Appendix D addtionally implies that the turnover
of losers on average moves to the opposite direction to market turnover. Therefore, the reasons
could lie behind large market movements, that have potentially aﬀected the investor behavior
into more cautious trading reactions, when faced with new price extremes.
Furthermore, the interpretation for my results could be, that as the stock begins trading as a
loser, this mental account lingers in the investors minds, thus making its eﬀect stronger than
the suspected reference price, and eventually elevating the new reference price higher than
expected. The eﬀect of record low prices, though not significant, seem to decrease turnover,
which would comply with the disposition eﬀect.
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Table 10: Daily Pooled Turnover Regression Results for Losers
The sample of 499 firms consists of losers, that cross their oﬀer price from below for the first time
between 21 and 484 trading days. The residuals from regression 1 (see Table 8) are held as the
dependent variable. The base case only accounts for the record high and low factors, while the
second regression includes the interaction variables of the magnitude of the record high and low
prices. The sample period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Base Case HI/LO interactions
Variable Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept 0.00943 0.28516 0.01004 0.2348
Record High 1M -0.04689 -0.51467 -0.01515 -0.16338
Record Low 1M 0.00231 0.02357 -0.00227 -0.02231
Record High 1M (R>5%) -0.53764 -1.84993 *
Record Low 1M (R<5%) 0.02810 0.10748
First Cross Above 0.95 0.14247 0.06961 0.10949 0.05349
First Cross Above 1.00 0.0499 0.0111 0.0782 0.0174
First Cross Above 1.05 -0.03381 -0.0476 -0.05121 -0.0722
First Cross Above 1.10 -0.0129 -0.0014 0.0420 0.0047
First Cross Above 1.15 -0.27423 -0.02879 -0.30541 -0.03206
First Cross Above 1.20 0.37532 0.05406 0.39537 0.05694
First Cross Above 1.25 -0.06827 -0.0863 -0.01516 -0.0192
First Cross Above 1.30 -0.0429 -0.050 -0.1413 -0.0165
First Cross Above 1.35 0.07048 0.0818 0.12578 0.01460
First Cross Above 1.40 -0.09627 -0.0696 -0.08715 -0.0630
Second Cross Above 0.70 -0.05979 -0.05604 -0.07869 -0.07374
Second Cross Above 0.75 0.08594 0.08057 0.06558 0.06147
Second Cross Above 0.80 -0.03086 -0.02944 -0.05170 -0.04932
Second Cross Above 0.85 0.02424 0.02266 0.0295 0.0276
Second Cross Above 0.90 -0.0888 -0.0834 -0.3038 -0.2851
Second Cross Above 0.95 0.33060 0.30785 0.30590 0.28482
Second Cross Above 1.00 0.4370 0.3786 0.0892 0.0773
Second Cross Above 1.05 0.14817 0.12161 0.11168 0.9165
Second Cross Above 1.10 0.18771 0.14616 0.14081 0.10962
Second Cross Above 1.15 0.12615 0.9653 0.7702 0.5892
Second Cross Above 1.20 0.10867 0.7946 0.6268 0.4582
Second Cross Above 1.25 0.4545 0.3160 0.0490 0.0341
Second Cross Above 1.30 0.3865 0.2537 -0.0273 -0.0179
Second Cross Above 1.35 0.14693 0.9233 0.12976 0.8153
Second Cross Above 1.40 0.17586 0.10605 0.14216 0.8572
Second Cross Above 1.45 0.11329 0.6804 0.8761 0.5261
Second Cross Above 1.50 0.27341 0.15471 0.23553 0.13327
Second Cross Above 1.55 -0.6252 -0.3406 -0.9855 -0.5368
RANGE [0.00, 0.10] -0.10453 -0.5684 -0.8541 -0.4629
RANGE [0.10, 0.20] 0.13144 0.9365 0.15455 0.10967
RANGE [0.20, 0.30] -0.58702 -0.49714 -0.56197 -0.47390
RANGE [0.30, 0.40] -0.29337 -0.28006 -0.23125 -0.21970
RANGE [0.40, 0.50] -0.18572 -0.18731 -0.10900 -0.10943
RANGE [0.50, 0.60] -0.33127 -0.33795 -0.26573 -0.26998
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RANGE [0.60, 0.70] -0.50120 -0.51796 -0.42440 -0.43743
RANGE [0.70, 0.75] 0.10430 0.10584 0.19000 0.19246
RANGE [0.75, 0.80] -0.16014 -0.16259 -0.6524 -0.6612
RANGE [0.80, 0.85] -0.11251 -0.11383 -0.3845 -0.3887
RANGE [0.85, 0.90] -0.3799 -0.3785 0.5911 0.5880
RANGE [0.90, 0.95] -0.3745 -0.3548 0.6711 0.6348
RANGE [0.95, 1.00] 0.3350 0.3107 0.14086 0.13042
RANGE [1.05, 1.10] 0.10794 0.9203 0.26975 0.22933
RANGE [1.10, 1.15] -0.4041 -0.3270 0.13399 0.10812
RANGE [1.15, 1.20] -0.36112 -0.28261 -0.22114 -0.17276
RANGE [1.20, 1.25] 0.6020 0.4582 0.22718 0.17251
RANGE [1.25, 1.30] -0.18893 -0.13374 -0.7235 -0.5117
RANGE [1.30, 1.40] -0.31952 -0.22352 -0.8137 -0.5669
RANGE [1.40, 1.50] -0.12832 -0.8297 0.8493 0.5477
RANGE [1.50, 1.60] -0.22002 -0.13473 -0.2444 -0.1493
RANGE [1.60, 1.70] -0.29926 -0.16920 -0.9639 -0.5440
RANGE [1.70, 1.80] 0.17385 0.8831 0.33576 0.17038
RANGE [1.80, 1.90] 0.2756 0.1380 0.19327 0.9668
RANGE [1.90, 2.00] 0.3805 0.1849 0.21561 0.10467
RANGE [2.00[ 0.3087 0.1465 0.34692 0.16412
R2 0.27 % 0.28 %
No. of observations 241516 241516
No. of variables 56 58
Also regarding the crossing variables, the results are mixed compared to the study of Kaustia
(2004). In line with his results is the observation that as the loser stock crosses its oﬀer price
for the first time, the volume increases. In my study, after this the pattern however seems to
turn into a decrease in the trading behavior. In other words, the losers that become winners,
are not realized but rather kept. At first crossing the 0.95 and 1.00 seem to increase the
turnover, but after this it suddenly starts a declining pattern. This is not consistent with
the disposition eﬀect, but it does give additional weight to the observations above, that the
“loser label” could follow the stock, thus lowering the new “break-even-point” or approvable
reference level.
The second crossings’ deviate from the first crossings pattern, which is illustrated in Figure 12.
It seems that now after crossing the level of 0.95 results in increased trading, which continues
up through the crossing levels. This could be a direct implication of a shifted reference price.
It seems the loser stigma is not prevalent anymore, as the loser stock presents a recurring
shift upwards. Moreover, the shift in turnover seems less volatile than with the first crossings,
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indicating a steadier response to the new price levels, perhaps a sign of a more adjustable
reference price.
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Figure 12: Price Level Crossings, Losers
First and second crossings of the oﬀer price level represent the turnover eﬀect of the coeﬃcients of
the losers’ pooled regression. E.g. at the level of 1.05, the turnover is aﬀected by a log decrease of
-0.0338, which is the coeﬃcient value of the first crossing above level 1.05.
Coming to the ranges’ eﬀects, the lower levels seem to have a consistent diminishing eﬀect on
the turnover, which is in line with the disposition eﬀect of not wanting to realize losses. At the
combined range between 0.95 and 1.10 the eﬀect is however changed, as trading increases. This
result is in line with the second crossings pattern. In other words, it seems that the trading
increases already below the oﬀer price, which on its part, could suggest a lower reference
price for losers. The forming of the reference prices is therefore not straight-forward, which
supports earlier research results.
Furthermore, each time a first-time crossing occurs, it is at the same time a one-month high,
which causes the price range to change. Therefore, to get the total eﬀect from crossing the
oﬀer price level, one has to sum up the coeﬃcients for Record High 1M, First Cross Above
1.00 and the change that is caused from changing the price level from [0.95, 1.00[ to [1.00,
1.05[. This yields a 8.9% increase in the turnover, which is quite low. About half of the
66
turnover increase can be explained by the new record high price, one third by the price range
change and about 5% from crossing the reference level for the first time.
6.3 Market trend regressions
In this section, the subsample groups are further divided into two groups based on the pre-
vailing market trend at the time of the issue. The segmentation follows the determinants of a
bull and a bear market period, as explained in Section 4. Furthermore, only the results of the
interaction inhibited regression are displayed, as there was no significant diﬀerence between
the results of the two variable interaction models.
6.3.1 First stage market regressions
The results of the first regressions are displayed in Table 11. The first-stage variables seem
to comply in significance with the variables of the overall model at the same stage. Both
maximum and minimum return seem to generate positive impact on the turnover, regardless
of the prevailing market conditions. Moreover, volatility seems to increase the winners as well
as the losers bull turnover. Conversely, during bear times the volatility seems to decrease the
trading of assets for both groups.
Figure 13 describes the bull and bear market IPOs divided by their initial returns. As
discussed before on the price support eﬀects, in accordance with this figure, the zero return
group indeed seems to distort the normality of the distribution, which further justifies the
exclusion of this group from the regression analysis.
6.3.2 Second-stage market trend regressions for the winners
Table 12 represents the results of the pooled second-stage regressions for the winners. Accord-
ing to the hypotheses, the disposition eﬀect should be more observable under a bull market,
because there are more noise traders. Looking at Table 12, this seems to hold. The intercept
is highly significant, indicating a decline in trade if all the variables remain unchanged. Other
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Table 11: Individual Firm Daily Average Turnover Regression Results Under Dif-
ferent Market Conditions
Each firm is defined to belong to either winning or losing group by the sign of the initial returns.
Both samples are then further divided into Bull and Bear groups defined by the market trend at
the time of the oﬀering. All variable results represent the daily firm-specific average values. The
sample period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Winners Losers
Variable Bull Bear Bull Bear
Turnover (Constant) 0,0858 0,0398 0,0983 1,5373
(15,4475) (1,7309) (8,4565) (1,0187)
Market turnover 0,0656 0,0525 -0,0144 -1,4642
(4,4107) (2,6111) (-0,2963) (-0,8852)
Turnover -1 day 0,0000 0,0003 0,0001 -0,0001
(-0,4208) (1,6503) (0,7890) (-1,0918)
Turnover -2 days 0,0002 0,0002 0,0003 0,0002
(0,9128) (0,9465) (1,6522) (2,2027)
Time since oﬀer 0,0002 0,0053 0,0008 -0,2197
(0,2111) (1,4453) (0,4633) (-0,9806)
Time sqrt 0,0000 -0,0002 -0,0001 0,0084
(-0,9690) (-1,3446) (-1,1126) (0,9911)
Maximum return 0,1562 0,5417 0,1859 6,0163
(4,2544) (2,7558) (1,8548) (0,9743)
Minimum return 0,1442 0,4313 0,4069 2,6100
(4,0702) (2,7277) (1,5652) (0,9720)
Volatility 3,3110 -2,5993 4,3193 -14,6507
(4,5298) (-1,0014) (2,8748) (-0,6766)
Returns -1 day 0,0151 0,0032 0,0565 -0,4826
(1,3424) (0,1579) (2,5701) (-0,9044)
Returns -2 days 0,0021 -0,0093 -0,0380 -0,3692
(0,1878) (-0,4473) (-1,1106) (-1,1551)
Adj. R2 25.3 % 19.8% 21.1 % 17.6%
No. of firms 712 316 332 167
Max no. of obervations per firm 484
variables displaying significant results during bull period include the price maximums and
minimums, first crossing the levels 1.20, 1.05 and 0.90, as well as the second crossing of level
0.85. Therefore it seems that under bull markets, new record high and low prices increase
the turnover, but as their magnitude crosses beyond 5% the eﬀect turns into negative and
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Figure 13: Number of IPOs under Diﬀerent Market Conditions
Number of IPOs consists of the full sample divided by the market trend at the time of the initial
public oﬀer, and then placed in initial return class according to the relation between the oﬀer price
and first-day closing price of each firm. Sample period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December
2011.
the trading decreases. Especially the Record low 1M below 5% is highly significant implying
that investors hold on to the (initially winning and) now losing stocks.
Figure 14 provides more insight into the relation between first and second time crossings
during bull and bear markets. Intuitively it can be interpreted, that during the bull markets
the second line crossings seem to foresee the movements of the first line. Obviously, because
the first line crossings occur first, this suggest that the first reactions have influenced the
second reactions so that the reference price seems to have moved upwards.
For example, if we follow the highest values on the winners market trend graphs, it can be
seen that the highest peak for the bull period occurs at the level of 0.90, whereas the highest
peak for the bear period (as well as for the overall period in Figure 11) occurs at the level
of 0.95. These turnover peaks represent the new record low points for the winners. The
latter is consistent with the disposition eﬀect, because the price has just fallen below its oﬀer
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price which is the pain spot for the investors. During the bull period, the same magnitude
eﬀect is triggered not until the 0.90 level, which could be interpreted as the new pain point,
as it seems the investors are more optimistic and do not realize the share before this level.
Moreover, because the level of 0.90 is significant, the logical explanation could be that during
bull markets investors are more optimistic and therefore the notion of reference price allows
for a lower break-even point than during bear markets.
Table 12: Winners’ Pooled Regression Results based on the Prevailing Market
Trend
The sample of 1028 firms consists of winners, that cross their oﬀer price from above for the first
time between 21 and 484 trading days. The residuals from regression 1 (see Table 8) are held as
the dependent variable. The bull period regression accounts for firms issued under bull market
conditions, while the bear regression describes the issued under bear market conditions. The sample
period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Bull period Bear period
Variable Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept -0.0111 -46.0360 *** -0.003532 -2.4580
Record High 1M 0.0358 68.8270 *** 0.0345 10.3750
Record Low 1M 0.0251 52.426 *** 0.0037 1.3121
Record High 1M (R>5%) -0.0290 -15.4180 0.0256 2.3944
Record Low 1M (R<-5%) -0.0623 -51.7560 *** -0.0760 -12.6250
First Cross Below 1.20 0.1476 19.9260 * -0.1905 -4.6070
First Cross Below 1.15 -0.0227 -2.6190 0.1579 3.2580
First Cross Below 1.10 -0.0705 -8.1610 -0.0212 -0.4450
First Cross Below 1.05 0.1243 19.9840 * 0.0711 1.3990
First Cross Below 1.00 0.0028 0.4050 0.0637 1.5910
First Cross Below 0.95 0.1217 13.7100 0.1740 3.7030
First Cross Below 0.90 0.1811 19.7010 * -0.1469 -3.0150
First Cross Below 0.85 -0.0587 -6.1780 -0.1233 -2.4570
First Cross Below 0.80 -0.1338 -14.4200 0.0190 0.3890
Second Cross Below 1.20 0.0765 13.5590 0.0694 2.1130
Second Cross Below 1.15 -0.0799 -13.9260 -0.0859 -2.5410
Second Cross Below 1.10 0.0775 13.3070 -0.2314 -6.9500
Second Cross Below 1.05 -0.0839 -13.8100 -0.0888 -2.5930
Second Cross Below 1.00 0.0478 8.0740 -0.1088 -3.2640
Second Cross Below 0.95 0.0908 1.4940 0.1350 3.8500
Second Cross Below 0.90 0.0632 10.2760 -0.1327 -3.6780
Second Cross Below 0.85 -0.1265 -20.2820 * 0.0030 0.0810
Second Cross Below 0.80 -0.0623 -9.2690 0.0470 1.2580
RANGE [0.00, 0.70] 0.1276 19.1750 . 0.0593 1.6700
RANGE [0.70, 0.75] 0.0540 8.2760 0.0191 0.5410
RANGE [0.75, 0.80] 0.0671 7.5240 -0.0479 -1.0280
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RANGE [0.80, 0.85] 0.0867 9.6000 0.1146 2.4440
RANGE [0.85, 0.90] -0.1168 -13.3700 0.2251 4.9710
RANGE [0.90, 0.95] -0.0914 -10.5660 -0.1095 -2.5040
RANGE [0.95, 1.00] 0.1064 19.618 * 0.0790 2.1500
RANGE [1.05, 1.10] 0.1388 26.1610 ** 0.1736 4.3670
RANGE [1.10, 1.15] 0.3399 64.0919 *** -0.0103 -0.2550
RANGE [1.15, 1.20] -0.0522 -8.0660 0.0448 1.1960
RANGE [1.20, 1.25] -0.0320 -5.9980 0.0871 2.8080
RANGE [1.25, 1.30] 0.0915 17.0540 . -0.0241 -0.7810
RANGE [1.30[ -0.0437 -9.4110 -0.0418 -1.5200
R2 0.59 % 0.42 %
No. of observations 344608 152460
No. of variables 35 35
No. of firms 712 316
The same eﬀect can be seen with the other peak in the figure at the bull level of 1.05 and the
bear and normal levels of 1.15. This would imply that the market conditions do aﬀect the
reference price formation.
During bear markets, the second crossings seem to synchronize with the first crossings, the
only diﬀerence being that the eﬀect seems to be much more decreasing the trading. However,
crossing below 0.95 momentarily increases the turnover, as the stock falls below its oﬀer price.
Still, the bear market turnover reactions act accordingly with the overall pattern.
Additional highly significant results during the bull period include the ranges of [0.95, 1.00[,
[1.05, 1.10[ and the range of [1.10, 1.15[. The results suggest that trading at these ranges
compared to the oﬀer price does increase the sale of the winning stock, in line with the
disposition eﬀect, whereas the preceding levels above and below these ranges seem to decrease
turnover. At ranges below these, the eﬀect continues to be positive, and suggests that during
bull markets, winners are sold even at a loss.
As hypothesized, the eﬀects of the individual variables are less observable under bear markets,
as there are no statistically significant impacts. However, the coeﬃcients most close to being
significant are the record high price and record low price over -5%.
When assessing the total eﬀect of the bull period first time cross below the oﬀer price, the
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Figure 14: Market Trend Adjusted Price Level Crossings, Winners
First and second crossings represent the coeﬃcients of the winners’ regression. E.g. At Cross Below
1.15 during the Bull period, the first crossing of this level results in a log decrease of 0.0227 in the
turnover, while the same level during Bear period results in a log increase of 0.1579 in total turnover.
combined log eﬀect of Record Low 1M, First Cross Below 1.00 and the change in price ranges
yields an 14.4% increase in the turnover as the level is surpassed. The corresponding figure
for the bear period turnover increase is 15.8%, which is not consistent with the hypothesis
that the disposition eﬀect would be less observable under bear markets. In fact, this suggests,
that the reaction during bear markets is somewhat larger. On the other hand, as observed
above, the reference price seems to be lower for the bull period. This would further suggest,
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that there is no diﬀerence between the market conditions’ total eﬀect on the turnover, but
it is indeed incorporated within the prices. What is however significant, is the finding, that
the reference price seems to vary according to the prevailing market trend, at least for the
winners. The losers are assessed similarly in the next section.
6.3.3 Second-stage market trend regressions for the losers
The results of the second-stage market trend regressions for the losers are displayed in Ta-
ble 13. The significance of variables of the loser firms’ bull period are more observable and
strongly significant when compared to the bear market’s results.
During bull markets, both the record high and low prices play a significant role in determining
the size of the turnover. The bull intercept is highly significant, indicating a decrease in
turnover if other variables remain unchanged. The bear market intercept however suggests
an increase in turnover, although the result is not statistically significant.
Table 13: Losers’ Pooled Regression Results based on the Prevailing Market Trend
The sample of 499 firms consists of losers, that cross their oﬀer price from below for the first
time between 21 and 484 trading days. The residuals from regression 1 (see Table 8) are held as
the dependent variable. The bull period regression accounts for firms issued under bull market
conditions, while the bear regression describes the issued under bear market conditions. The sample
period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Bull period Bear period
Variable Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept -0.0215 -25.8197 *** 0.32341 2.5652
Record High 1M 0.0593 33.2007 *** -0.5281 -1.8960
Record Low 1M 0.0579 29.7098 *** -0.1329 -0.4275
Record High 1M (R>5%) 0.0903 16.4536 . -18.0363 -19.8048 *
Record Low 1M (R<-5%) -0.0907 -17.4532 * 0.9845 1.3191
First Cross Above 0.95 -0.2629 -7.1195 3.6056 0.4876
First Cross Above 1.00 0.7684 8.4883 -3.1645 -0.2477
First Cross Above 1.05 -0.6405 -5.5247 23.6072 0.4926
First Cross Above 1.10 -0.2963 -2.5225 -9.7791 -0.4750
First Cross Above 1.15 2.4132 14.7658 * -10.1713 -0.4283
First Cross Above 1.20 -0.4063 -1.9611 4.1753 0.1774
First Cross Above 1.25 -0.4480 -2.1829 -5.6781 -0.2411
First Cross Above 1.30 -0.7411 -3.3338 4.4522 0.1865
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First Cross Above 1.35 -0.3624 -1.6206 2.3081 0.0987
First Cross Above 1.40 0.1873 0.8386 -1.3237 -0.0556
Second Cross Above 0.70 -0.1337 -6.5427 -1.9152 -0.5888
Second Cross Above 0.75 0.0134 0.6560 1.9192 0.5938
Second Cross Above 0.80 -0.1759 -8.6814 -1.0578 -0.3370
Second Cross Above 0.85 -0.1239 -6.0121 0.2187 0.0677
Second Cross Above 0.90 -0.0551 -2.7051 -0.8001 -0.2453
Second Cross Above 0.95 -0.1215 -5.8862 9.6693 2.9693
Second Cross Above 1.00 0.2044 9.2612 0.3440 0.0973
Second Cross Above 1.05 0.2106 9.0029 3.0666 0.8334
Second Cross Above 1.10 1.3455 54.7480 *** 1.9388 0.4913
Second Cross Above 1.15 -0.1813 -7.2355 2.8518 0.7149
Second Cross Above 1.20 -0.1037 -3.9707 1.7896 0.4253
Second Cross Above 1.25 0.2237 8.2336 -0.1688 -0.0373
Second Cross Above 1.30 -0.2947 -10.1057 0.7969 0.1701
Second Cross Above 1.35 0.2254 7.2649 3.5680 0.7550
Second Cross Above 1.40 0.0646 2.0045 4.3206 0.8759
Second Cross Above 1.45 -0.1408 -4.3743 3.0604 0.6128
Second Cross Above 1.50 -0.1000 -2.9147 7.2458 1.3807
Second Cross Above 1.55 0.0105 0.2932 -3.0954 -0.5753
RANGE [0.00, 0.10] -0.1417 -3.8787 -1.9210 -0.3636
RANGE [0.10, 0.20] 0.3147 11.0390 2.9558 0.7590
RANGE [0.20, 0.30] -0.1366 -5.9505 -16.9077 -4.7815
RANGE [0.30, 0.40] 0.3319 16.3155 * -7.5236 -2.3895
RANGE [0.40, 0.50] -0.1524 -7.9209 -2.9747 -0.9961
RANGE [0.50, 0.60] -0.0062 -0.3262 -8.2402 -2.7505
RANGE [0.60, 0.70] -0.1886 -9.9974 -12.1032 -4.2169
RANGE [0.70, 0.75] -0.1554 -8.2167 6.0927 2.0270
RANGE [0.75, 0.80] -0.1674 -8.8183 -3.2222 -1.0800
RANGE [0.80, 0.85] -0.1702 -8.8861 -1.3280 -0.4496
RANGE [0.85, 0.90] -0.1716 -8.8998 2.2923 0.7503
RANGE [0.90, 0.95] -0.0831 -4.0872 3.1695 0.9899
RANGE [0.95, 1.00] -0.2329 -11.1405 5.4734 1.6977
RANGE [1.05, 1.10] -0.2164 -9.5876 10.3814 2.9047
RANGE [1.10, 1.15] -0.0773 -3.2610 5.8573 1.5308
RANGE [1.15, 1.20] -0.1830 -7.5755 -6.4131 -1.6196
RANGE [1.20, 1.25] -0.0862 -3.4378 7.1096 1.7474
RANGE [1.25, 1.30] -0.2672 -10.0655 -2.3020 -0.5069
RANGE [1.30, 1.40] -0.0680 -2.4853 -1.6380 -0.3678
RANGE [1.40, 1.50] 0.4272 14.5117 3.0470 0.6320
RANGE [1.50, 1.60] -0.2734 -8.7278 -2.0717 -0.4145
RANGE [1.60, 1.70] 0.0057 0.1663 -1.6378 -0.3120
RANGE [1.70, 1.80] 0.3160 8.3618 12.3098 2.0542
RANGE [1.80, 1.90] 0.0085 0.2217 6.5669 1.0729
RANGE [1.90, 2.00] -0.0096 -0.2460 4.3783 0.6825
RANGE [2.00[ -0.0588 -1.4679 10.3701 1.5721
R2 0.61 % 0.27 %
No. of observations 160688 80828
No. of variables 58 58
No. of firms 332 167
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Under a bear market, only the variable of record high price over 5% is significant and causes
the turnover to decline. This could be a sign of future expectations on the losing stock to
grow, as it is not sold even at a record high price, whereas in the bull market the eﬀect is of
a positive kind leading to realization of the asset.
More diﬀerencies between the markets include the price drop below -5%, which leads to
decreased trading in bull markets whereas during bear markets the eﬀect is estimated to
increase trading (even not statistically significantly). This could imply that the disposition
eﬀect does not apply well to bear markets, which could further be due to the fact that there
are estimated to be more institutional traders during bear markets, as explained in Section
2.1.
Further implications of the results include the second crossing of the bull period 1.10 price
level, which leads to a highly significant increase in trading. This is a direct implication of
the disposition eﬀect as the loser is realized after crossing the oﬀer price level, which can
therefore be considered as the dominating reference price. However, the reference level must
have changed after the first crossing, since the same level at first crossing leads to a decrease
in trading.
Looking at Figure 15 this can be seen even more clearly. The bull level of crossing 1.15 forms
the maximum eﬀect peak in the graph, which matches the bear level of 1.05. During bull
markets, crossing the level of the oﬀer price for the first time at 1.15 winnings, generates a
highly significant increase in turnover, and the following first crossings do not. During bear
markets, the highest increase in turnover is reached at the level of crossing the oﬀer price
at 1.05. This result is also significant, because it is at the same time a new record high
price larger than 5%. It seems the pessimistic investors realize their shares quicker than the
optimistic investors. Therefore, the same pattern that was observed with the winners, can be
seen with the losers as well.
The second crossings overall seem to generate a steadier turnover eﬀect without as high peaks
or throughs as with the first events. Especially, the bear period seems to balance the reactions
to almost a straight line. This could also be a sign of a flexible reference price as the price
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Figure 15: Market Trend Adjusted Price Level Crossings, Losers
First and second crossings represent the coeﬃcients of the losers’ regression. E.g. At Cross Above
1.15 during the Bull period, the first crossing of this level results in a log increase of 2.4132 in
the turnover, while the same level during Bear period results in a log decrease of -10.1713 in total
turnover.
movements do not eﬀect the turnover as roughly anymore. On the other hand, investors may
be more cautious in their movements and not as hasty to trade as in the bull markets, which
could stem from less individual noise investors during the bear markets.
When assessing the eﬀects to the total turnover, by summing up the coeﬃcients of Record
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High 1M, First Cross Above 1.00 and the change in price ranges, this yields a 79.2% increase in
total turnover, which is relatively speaking quite high. The corresponding increase in turnover
during bear period is 72.8%. Therefore, the total turnover does not seem to be aﬀected by
diﬀerent market conditions, but rather the reference price is adjusted based on the prevailing
market trend.
Overall, the crossings of the losers seem to generate much more stronger shifts in the turnover,
as the coeﬃcients are larger than the winners’.
6.4 Initial return size regression eﬀects
In this final regression analysis I have divided the subsamples based on the magnitude of the
initial returns separately for winners and losers. The size of the underpricing of winners is
defined by the 40% largest initial return stocks making the upper group the “largely under-
priced” firms, whilst the other represent the average and small underpricing levels. The losers
have been divided in the same way based on the magnitude of the overpricing, respectively.
The results of the winners are placed in Table 14 and the results of the losers in Table 15.
Table 14: Winners’ Regression Results for the Magnitude of the Underpricing
Number of largely underpriced winners is 287 and number of average underpriced firms is 741. Large
underpricing corresponds to the largest 40% i.e. above 17,3% initial return for the winners. The
sample period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Large initial returns Average initial returns
Variable Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept -0.0005 -0.380 -0.0066 -11.2570
Record High 1M 0.0304 7.6500 0.0266 19.9680 *
Record Low 1M -0.0027 -0.8980 0.0153 11.6530
Record High 1M (R>5%) -0.0142 -1.2930 -0.0486 -10.9940
Record Low 1M (R<-5%) -0.0565 -9.6250 -0.0761 -24.0340 *
First Cross Below 1.20 -0.0323 -0.6600 0.3418 20.7530 *
First Cross Below 1.15 0.0014 0.0250 -0.1210 -6.4030
First Cross Below 1.10 -0.2059 -3.5680 0.0101 0.5590
First Cross Below 1.05 0.0503 0.8460 -0.0020 -0.0940
First Cross Below 1.00 -0.0472 -0.9140 -0.1224 -8.0390
First Cross Below 0.95 0.2701 4.4740 0.0317 1.7180
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First Cross Below 0.90 -0.3004 -4.8990 0.4362 20.8070 *
First Cross Below 0.85 0.1890 3.1310 -0.5015 -23.7780 *
First Cross Below 0.80 -0.1406 -2.3140 0.0546 2.6760
Second Cross Below 1.20 0.1561 4.0820 0.1471 12.2000
Second Cross Below 1.15 -0.0294 -0.7560 0.1026 8.5300
Second Cross Below 1.10 -0.0100 -0.2450 0.1186 10.0040
Second Cross Below 1.05 -0.2022 -4.7120 -0.1101 -8.8450
Second Cross Below 1.00 0.1823 4.2140 -0.0221 -1.7220
Second Cross Below 0.95 0.1085 2.4980 -0.0371 -2.8870
Second Cross Below 0.90 -0.0369 -0.8310 -0.2572 -19.6650 *
Second Cross Below 0.85 -0.1087 -2.4190 -0.0957 -6.9950
Second Cross Below 0.80 -0.1002 -2.2670 -0.0682 -4.6760
RANGE [0.00, 0.70] 0.3283 7.6370 -0.1428 -10.1190
RANGE [0.70, 0.75] 0.0141 0.3290 -0.1033 -7.3340
RANGE [0.75, 0.80] 0.0375 0.6810 -0.0994 -5.0450
RANGE [0.80, 0.85] 0.0599 1.1510 0.5388 26.4210 **
RANGE [0.85, 0.90] 0.0782 1.4340 -0.0984 -4.9110
RANGE [0.90, 0.95] -0.2110 -3.8490 0.0976 5.5500
RANGE [0.95, 1.00] 0.1993 4.2710 0.1294 8.8050
RANGE [1.05, 1.10] 0.2591 5.1530 0.2403 21.675 *
RANGE [1.10, 1.15] 0.2372 4.9320 0.0785 5.6230
RANGE [1.15, 1.20] -0.1525 -3.4130 0.2416 21.038 *
RANGE [1.20, 1.25] -0.0352 -0.9770 -0.1588 -13.6880 *
RANGE [1.25, 1.30] 0.1012 2.8260 0.2349 19.9350 *
RANGE [1.30[ -0.1287 -4.9480 -0.0933 -7.8280
R2 0.35 % 0.83 %
No. of observations 138908 358644
No. of variables 35 35
No. of firms 287 741
As explained in Section 2.3, larger underpricing should result in larger trading volume, as
the reference point is updated more with stronger surprises. What can be seen from the
Table 14 is that the firms of average or low underpricing seem to possess smaller turnover
movement eﬀects than the largely underpriced firms. Still, the only statistically significant
eﬀects are obtained with the average and small underpriced groups at record highs (positive)
and lows (negative), first crosses below 1.20 (positive), 0.90 (positive) and 0.85 (negative),
second crossings below 0.90 (negative) and trading at ranges [0.80, 0.85[, [1.05, 1.10[ and
between [1.15, 1.30[.
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Table 15: Losers’ Regression Results for the Magnitude of the Overpricing
Number of largely overpriced losers is 287 and number of average overpriced firms is 741. Large
overpricing corresponds to the largest 40% losses over -8.62%. The sample period runs from 1
January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Large initial losses Average initial losses
Variable Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Intercept -0.0167 -8.1829 . -0.006889 -10.2542 *
Record High 1M 0.0564 17.9772 . 0.0394 23.1115 *
Record Low 1M 0.1002 20.7725 * 0.0110 7.7566
Record High 1M (R>5%) 0.1153 12.1077 -0.0008 -0.1204
Record Low 1M (R<-5%) 0.3212 32.7975 ** -0.7416 -22.4143 *
First Cross Above 0.95 0.4123 1.9936 -0.5228 -23.3126 *
First Cross Above 1.00 0.6785 2.6971 1.1138 27.5283 **
First Cross Above 1.05 -1.0718 -5.1966 -0.8175 -12.9022
First Cross Above 1.10 0.3520 1.7039 0.8760 11.2930
First Cross Above 1.15 0.6690 2.6540 -1.1331 -14.7860
First Cross Above 1.20 -1.0098 -4.9010 0.7702 14.3952
First Cross Above 1.25 -0.2428 -5.8515 0.0537 0.8420
First Cross Above 1.30 -0.0241 -0.5604 0.2219 3.4686
First Cross Above 1.35 0.0111 0.2497 -0.0898 -1.1463
First Cross Above 1.40 0.0357 7.7385 -0.5436 -6.7750
Second Cross Above 0.70 -0.2370 -5.7025 -0.1015 -6.6330
Second Cross Above 0.75 0.0049 0.1136 -0.1526 -10.1887
Second Cross Above 0.80 0.0453 1.0176 -0.0435 -3.1209
Second Cross Above 0.85 0.2318 5.0111 -0.1445 -9.6242
Second Cross Above 0.90 0.2732 5.7309 0.1851 12.8279
Second Cross Above 0.95 -0.0556 -1.1285 0.1394 9.4175
Second Cross Above 0.95 0.1251 2.4636 -0.1902 -11.6104
Second Cross Above 1.00 0.0369 0.6565 0.0003 0.0168
Second Cross Above 1.05 0.1641 2.8842 0.0834 4.2503
Second Cross Above 1.10 -0.0799 -1.3056 0.1862 9.8266
Second Cross Above 1.15 0.0149 0.2306 0.0387 2.0456
Second Cross Above 1.20 0.2514 3.7695 0.1581 7.9068
Second Cross Above 1.25 -0.1789 -2.5097 -0.3049 -13.9895
Second Cross Above 1.30 -0.1155 -1.5212 -0.0263 -1.2092
Second Cross Above 1.35 0.3532 4.5064 -0.0836 -3.4738
Second Cross Above 1.40 -0.2323 -3.0446 0.2538 9.6948
Second Cross Above 1.45 0.1016 1.2118 0.3571 12.8802
Second Cross Above 1.50 -0.0334 -0.3591 -0.2329 -8.1661
RANGE [0.00, 0.10] -0.1267 -2.2831 -0.1682 -5.0206
RANGE [0.10, 0.20] 0.2666 6.0391 0.0358 1.5073
RANGE [0.20, 0.30] -0.2262 -5.7981 0.1872 9.8072
RANGE [0.30, 0.40] -0.0789 -2.2850 -0.0194 -1.1208
RANGE [0.40, 0.50] -0.0114 -0.3415 -0.0806 -5.1524
RANGE [0.50, 0.60] -0.1857 -5.2616 0.2570 17.2352 .
RANGE [0.60, 0.70] -0.0935 -2.5868 0.1030 7.3210
RANGE [0.70, 0.75] -0.1366 -3.4478 0.1783 12.9570
RANGE [0.75, 0.80] 0.0231 0.5736 -0.2999 -21.7255 *
RANGE [0.80, 0.85] -0.0657 -1.5659 0.1194 8.9665
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RANGE [0.85, 0.90] -0.0595 -1.3351 -0.0872 -6.0786
RANGE [0.90, 0.95] -0.0026 -0.0565 0.3877 25.2702 *
RANGE [0.95, 1.00] -0.2396 -4.9972 -0.2246 -14.9144
RANGE [1.05, 1.10] 0.1688 3.1491 -0.1264 -7.6046
RANGE [1.10, 1.15] -0.3535 -6.3545 0.4140 22.7056 *
RANGE [1.15, 1.20] -0.0726 -1.2664 -0.2222 -11.5056
RANGE [1.20, 1.25] -0.1046 -1.7542 0.1515 7.8140
RANGE [1.25, 1.30] -0.3052 -4.8453 0.0625 3.0730
RANGE [1.30, 1.40] -0.2597 -4.0501 0.4428 20.6693 *
RANGE [1.40, 1.50] 0.2241 3.0232 0.1070 4.5098
RANGE [1.50, 1.60] 0.0503 0.6508 -0.1558 -5.9795
RANGE [1.60, 1.70] -0.3252 -3.7799 0.0252 0.9042
RANGE [1.70, 1.80] 0.1452 1.5185 -0.2102 -6.2823
RANGE [1.80, 1.90] 0.0004 0.0042 -0.6113 -18.1981 .
RANGE [1.90, 2.00] 2.2955 17.2161 * 0.1853 5.2255
RANGE [2.00[ -0.3096 -3.2353 -0.4665 -12.9960
R2 2.50 % 1.9 %
No. of observations 72600 168916
No. of variables 58 58
No. of firms 150 349
According to Arkes et al. (2008), a reference point should also change more after a rise in the
stock, rather than a decline. The losers reveal the rising stock in the regression, which results
are in Table 15. The first crossings seem to generate larger turnover eﬀects for the losers.
Record high and low prices are significant for both groups of losers. The average overpriced
losers possess significant results: crossing the level 0.95 decreases turnover and the level 1.00
increases turnover. In line with disposition eﬀect, this would imply the reference price being
the oﬀer price. On the other hand, the largely overpriced losers do not give any statistically
significant results, although their coeﬃcients are of the positive sign. This result could also
be interpreted such, that as the eﬀect of the largest losses is taken away from the sample, the
investors seem to act according to the disposition eﬀect.
Figure 16 in Appendix B represents the crossings of the winners and Figure 17 in Appendix
C the same for the losers. The losers graphs seem consistent, but the large initial returns
winners crossings seem to be more volatile than the average initial returns group. This would
be in line with the hypothesis, although the results are not statistically significant.
Therefore, no other clear results can be derived out of the results, because of the lack of
significant coeﬃcients on each group. Yet, the average initial returns may incorporate smaller
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firms that possess more disposition eﬀect and therefore show more statistical significance. On
the other hand, the number of these firms is also twice as large, which probably has an eﬀect
on the results as well.
The overall eﬀects from these groupings based on the magnitude of the under/overpricing
do not seem to provide more beneficial information on the reference price formation. In
other words, the results do not show significant implications on investors consciously paying
attention to the size of the under/overpricing.
6.5 Analysis on weekly data
Following the study of Kaustia (2004), I have analyzed the winners and losers on a weekly
basis. The results can be seen in Table 16. Each level represents a first crossing. For example,
if the level 0.95 is crossed, the five days during that week receive the dummy value of one.
For the following weeks the days act as dummy variables in the same manner. This analysis
is done to model the turnover eﬀects in time.
As it can be seen, the new maximum price gains statistically significant results throughout
the weeks. The first week the maximum high price is discovered, it seems to immediately
aﬀect the turnover. The first two weeks give significant indications and the last two weeks
highly significant results. This could serve as a sign of investors reacting slower to the new
maximum. This is however only a speculation.
Other highly significant results are gained two weeks after crossing the 1.05, 1.00 and 0.95
levels from above for the first time. This crossing of these levels seems to give a lagged
response only on the second week after the price drop. Falling below 0.95 continues to have a
significant eﬀect still after four weeks, increasing trade. The results imply that if the winner
falls only somewhat below the oﬀer price, it has a lagged trade increasing eﬀect, but as it
further declines below 0.85 the eﬀect turns into an incentive to sell after two weeks.
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The losers’ results continue with almost the same pattern as the winners. The all-time high
price results in statistically significant turnover increasing eﬀects after two, three and four
weeks the new high has been met. However, the first week’s variable is not significant, which
could imply the eﬀect in turnover comes with a delay. On the other hand, as the disposition
eﬀect implies, losers are kept and not sold. Even more, it is not established what other factors
aﬀect the turnover during the next weeks, such as how many crossings happen during that
time that can have an eﬀect on the results. Therefore, insinuating anything else than, that
the new maximum price plays a significant role in the turnover fluctuation, would be highly
speculative.
6.6 Robustness checks
In order to guarantee the robustness of the results, I have run several other regressions by
diﬀerent variable combinations. For example, the preliminary regression variables were tested
to be included in the first-stage regression in determining the normal turnover eﬀects. The
eﬀect on the residuals was not as significant that it would have aﬀected the second-stage
regression results.
The initial data for the whole analysis was retrieved and sampled twice in order to be sure
that the segmentation would result in the same tickers and corresponding determinant values.
Additional robustness checks include testing diﬀerent panel data regression estimators. As
the regressions are run with diﬀerent estimators, the coeﬃcients vary somewhat, but no real
separating statistical implications arise from these measures, which reinforces the validity of
the results. The pooled method was tested also with the fixed and random methods. Actually,
as the analysis was done in the “R” environment, the analysis method itself had an incor-
porated feature to detect the right estimator based on the quality of the data. Nevertheless,
to be sure to exclude for example the random estimator from the second-stage regressions,
I run a Hausman test by comparing the fixed and random eﬀects, which preferred the first
one. Nevertheless, this is only a rhetoric procedure, as the model determinants were justified
already in the panel data description.
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Furthermore, the sample could have been divided into diﬀerent time periods based on e.g.
crisis times, but essentially the now employed method should lead to the same result because
the firms are divided by their tickers on the basis of the market trend at hand at the time of
the oﬀering.
As I believe the general preliminaries of the methods to have been well justified, there would
be no need for additional robustness checks, that would significantly alter the results.
7 Summary and conclusions
I have studied the determinants of reference prices under diﬀerent market conditions. The
results characterize the investor market behavior, as the data sample bases on aggregate
market-wide information, comprising not only individual observations but a representing sam-
ple of the whole market. In this paper, disposition eﬀect is the key preconditioning theory in
studying the reference price formation, as it can be modeled through the post-IPO trading
volume changes.
In the preliminary analysis, I have assessed the determinants potentially aﬀecting the turnover
of individual firms, by incorporating additional variables to the model of Kaustia (2004).
However, not the firm size, nor being subject to a lock-up agreement or a risky hightech firm,
had a significant eﬀect on the turnover. Market conditions at the time of the issue, on the
other hand, were found to significantly aﬀect the turnover, which justified the use of this
variable as a basis for the segmentation of the regression groups. Furthermore, firms were
analysed based on the size of their initial returns, which was hypothesized to generate stronger
results for firms with larger initial returns, yet did not yield significant results. Finally, the
firms were regressed separately through the weeks following the initial public oﬀering, partly
serving as a robusting last analysis, that reinforced the reference point observations of the
previous regressions.
I will next briefly assess the outcomes for each hypothesis.
H1: Post-IPO trading volume is higher in the price levels above the oﬀer price
H0 is accepted for the winners and rejected for losers. Especially the results from the pooled
regression for winners are significant, when the price trades at a range above the initial oﬀer
price. The losers however seem to suﬀer from a “loser stigma” as the trading does not increase
when the stock is trading above the oﬀer price.
H2: Trading volume for negative initial return IPOs increases when the oﬀer price is sur-
passed for the first time
H0 is rejected. Unlike the study of Kaustia (2004), my results seem to decrease the turnover
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as this record high price is reached. It seems that investors are reluctant to realize the losers
as they reach new record high prices. This may be a sign of a loser stigma. Furthermore,
when the IPO market price with a negative initial return exceeds the oﬀer price for the first
time, there should be an immediate eﬀect in terms of trading volume, and not a lagged one.
Accordingly, the disposition eﬀect would not seem significant enough to aﬀect the asset pricing
of the losers.
Reasons behind the diﬀerence in results of this study compared to the study of Kaustia (2004)
can be sought from the data samples. The correlations of the first-stage regression variables
are placed in Appendix D. The losers variables seem to be much more correlated with each
other than the winners’ variables. In fact, as the market return increases, it seems the turnover
of the losers almost perfectly linearly decreases. This could provide an explanation on the
diﬀering results on the losers’ regression, where crossing the oﬀer price should lead to an
increase in turnover whereas this does not seem to hold. If the normal turnover of the losers
moves to the opposite direction than the market, this alone could reverse the eﬀect of the
level crossings. It would require further research into what drives the turnover into react
diﬀerently in my study than in the results of Kaustia (2004). As I do not have the base data
for his research, I can only speculate on the underlying reasons. Nevertheless, this paper does
not find significant results in support of this hypothesis.
H3: Trading volume for positive initial return IPOs increases when the oﬀer price is surpassed
for the first time
H0 is accepted. Falling below 0.95 level causes the highest increase in turnover, which could
be due to price support, as the oﬀer price is surpassed for the first time. Still the results
are somewhat controversy, as trading at ranges just below the oﬀer price seems to lead to a
decrease in the total turnover. Falling below the oﬀer price still corresponds to a new record
low price, which is significant when the fall is more than 5%. About half of this turnover
increase can be explained by the new record high price, one third by the price range change
and about 5% from crossing the reference level for the first time.
H4: When new price maximums (minimums) are reached, trading volume increases
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H0 is accepted. Highly significant results are gained from both pooled regressions for winners
and losers, as well as from market regressions for both, and are also reinforced by the weekly
analysis data. This is a strong indication into the result that the new price maximums and
minimums alter the investor’s mental account and the reference price is adjusted accordingly.
These results are in line with the study of Gneezy (2005) who examines the eﬀects of prior
losses and gains on the formation of reference prices, and finds that historical peaks tend to
be the most descriptive reference prices that investors base their decisions on.
H5: Market conditions (bullish/bearish trends) aﬀect the reference price formation
H0 is accepted. For the case of the winners under bull markets, the investors seem to be more
optimistic with the reference price formation. As explained, the highest turnover peak for the
bull period occurs at crossing the level of 0.90, whereas the highest peak for the bear period
(as well as for the overall period in pooled regression for winners) occurs at the level of 0.95.
These peaks represent the new record low points for the winners. Moreover, because the level
of 0.90 is significant, it would seem that during bull markets investors are more optimistic and
therefore the reference price allows for a lower break-even point, than during bear markets.
The total eﬀect on the turnover did not however vary significantly between diﬀerent market
conditions. This could further suggest, that there lies no diﬀerence between the market
conditions’ total eﬀect on the turnover, but it is indeed incorporated within the prices. The
most significant finding is however, that the reference price seems to vary according to the
prevailing market trend, at least for the winners. Also the losers’ reference prices seem to
shift during the bull market to a more optimistic level.
H6: Reference price updating is more frequent under bull markets
H0 is accepted. When examining the first and second crossings, it can be noticed that the
adaptation to the new levels, represented by the second crossings line, is steadier under bear
markets and there are no sudden turnover movements, when compared to the bull market
lines. Moreover, the eﬀects of the individual variables are less observable under bear markets,
as there are no statistically significant impacts. The second crossings of the bull period for
winners seem to adjust to the prices more quickly, as the turnover peaks are obtained at
87
earlier crossing levels than the during the first crossings. These results further implicate that
the markets are followed more actively during bull conditions, as the reactions are quicker.
Additional market trend eﬀects include the finding that volatility seems to decrease the trading
during bear markets, and increase during bull markets.
Moreover, these results comply with the study of Arkes et al. (2008), who finds that reference
point adaption is found to be occurring more with rising stocks than the falling ones, which
makes it asymmetric. This also suggests that, as the investors on average have more winning
stocks than losing ones during rising markets, their reference point adaption is also faster.
This could explain the results of diﬀerent reference points varying by market conditions.
H7: Large initial returns cause more reference point adaptation
H0 is rejected. The overall eﬀects from these groupings based on the magnitude of the
under/overpricing do not seem to provide more beneficial information on the reference price
formation. In other words, the results do not show significant implications on investors
consciously paying attention to the size of the under/overpricing.
Furthermore, the analysis on the weekly data eﬀects implies that if the winner falls only
somewhat below the oﬀer price, it has a lagged trade increasing eﬀect, but as it further
declines below 0.85 the eﬀect turns into an incentive to sell after two weeks. For the losers,
the all-time high price results in statistically significant turnover increasing eﬀects after two,
three and four weeks the new high has been met. The first week’s variable is not however
statistically significant, which could mean that the turnover eﬀect lags. Moreover, it is not
established what other factors aﬀect the turnover during the next weeks. In other words,
more crossings probably happen during that time that can have an unknown eﬀect on the
results.
Finally, the driving forces behind investor behavior seem to be overconfidence and selective
attention during bull markets, as the reference prices adapt more quickly. As Kliger and
Kudryavtsev (2008) found, investors update the reference levels when they are exposed to
new information, which could apply here as well in the form of new record high and low
stock prices, which are quite significant reference prices according to the results. Also mental
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accounting can be characterized as an important factor when it comes to the new maximum
and minimum prices, as they shift the reference price notions within the mental accounts.
The most important finding of this study however is the fact that the reference prices seem to
be formed diﬀerently based on the prevailing market conditions. Even though it would seem
that the total turnover is not changed due to reverse market conditions, the reference prices,
on the other hand, are. Implications for further study would therefore include e.g. tracking
the specific reference price levels and measuring whether they are industry-connected or firm-
size-connected during diﬀerent market conditions, or whether a specific market event, such as
earnings or dividend announcements, have a diﬀerent eﬀect during reverse market conditions.
These could shed supplementary light on the underlying reference price determinants driving
the investor behavior.
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Table 17: Statistics of the Subsample Divided by Diﬀerent Market Conditions
The yearly number of winners and losers divided by the prevailing market conditions at the time of
the oﬀering. Sample period runs from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Winners 95 86 41 118 78 35 15 29
Bull 79 86 35 60 0 0 0 28
Bear 16 0 6 58 78 35 15 1
Losers 76 61 54 51 38 23 25 13
Bull 61 61 47 29 0 0 0 12
Bear 15 0 7 22 38 23 25 1
All 171 147 95 169 116 58 40 42
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total %
Winners 62 68 73 94 17 39 83 95 1028 100 %
Bull 62 49 53 75 0 21 83 81 712 69 %
Bear 0 19 20 19 17 18 0 14 316 31 %
Losers 22 17 18 28 9 15 21 28 499 100 %
Bull 22 13 13 22 0 12 21 19 332 67 %
Bear 0 4 5 6 9 3 0 9 167 33 %
All 84 85 91 122 26 54 104 123 1527 100 %
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Figure 16: Initial Return- Based Underpriced Winners’ Price Level Crossings
First and second crossings represent the coeﬃcients of the winners’ regression. E.g. An all-time low
turnover decrease at the level of Cross Below 0.90 for the largely underpriced winners corresponds
to the level of 0.85 for the average underpriced winners.
97
C Appendix
!""#""$%
!""#""$%
!""#""$%
!""#""$%
""#"""%
""#"""%
""#"""%
""#"""%
""#"""%
""#""$%
""#""$%
&'())%
*+(,-%
"./0%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.""%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$."0%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.$"%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.$0%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.1"%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.10%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.2"%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.20%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.3"%
%
-c
ha
ng
e 
Largely Overpriced Losers' Crossings of Price Levels 
45')6%&'())578)% 9-:(7;%&'())578)%
!""#""1%
!""#""$%
!""#""$%
""#"""%
""#""$%
""#""$%
""#""1%
&'())%
*+(,-%
"./0%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.""%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$."0%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.$"%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.$0%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.1"%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.10%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.2"%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.20%
&'())%
*+(,-%
$.3"%
%
-c
ha
ng
e 
Average Overpriced Losers' Crossings of Price Levels 
45')6%&'())578)% 9-:(7;%&'())578)%
Figure 17: Initial Return- Based Overpriced Losers’ Price Level Crossings
First and second crossings represent the coeﬃcients of the losers’ regression. The coeﬃcients of
crossing the price levels represent the changing eﬀect on the turnover of the losers.
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D AppendixFigure 18: Correlation Matrix of the First-Stage Regression Variables
The first-stage regression variables are correlated against each other separately for the winner and
loser subsamples. Variables are used to determine the daily normal turnover volume for each firm.
Values close to 1.00 imply a large positive linear correlation between the variables, whereas values
close to -1.00 indicate a negative linear relationship between the variables. Sample period runs from
1 January 1996 to 31 December 2011.
